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ABSTRACT 
 
Reliability Evaluation of Composite Power Systems Including the Effects of Hurricanes. 
(December 2010) 
Yong Liu, B.E., Huazhong University of Science and Technology; 
M.E., Nanyang Technological University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Chanan Singh 
 
 Adverse weather such as hurricanes can significantly affect the reliability of 
composite power systems. Predicting the impact of hurricanes can help utilities for better 
preparedness and make appropriate restoration arrangements. In this dissertation, the 
impact of hurricanes on the reliability of composite power systems is investigated. 
Firstly, the impact of adverse weather on the long-term reliability of composite 
power systems is investigated by using Markov cut-set method. The Algorithms for the 
implementation is developed. Here, two-state weather model is used. An algorithm for 
sequential simulation is also developed to achieve the same goal. The results obtained by 
using the two methods are compared. The comparison shows that the analytical method 
can obtain comparable results and meantime it can be faster than the simulation method. 
Secondly, the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite 
power systems is investigated. A fuzzy inference system is used to assess the failure rate 
increment of system components. Here, different methods are used to build two types of 
fuzzy inference systems. Considering the fact that hurricanes usually last only a few 
 iv
days, short-term minimal cut-set method is proposed to compute the time-specific 
system and nodal reliability indices of composite power systems. The implementation 
demonstrates that the proposed methodology is effective and efficient and is flexible in 
its applications.  
Thirdly, the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite power 
systems including common-cause failures is investigated. Here, two methods are 
proposed to archive this goal. One of them uses a Bayesian network to alleviate the 
dimensionality problem of conditional probability method. Another method extends 
minimal cut-set method to accommodate common-cause failures. The implementation 
results obtained by using the two methods are compared and their discrepancy is 
analyzed. 
Finally, the proposed methods in this dissertation are also applicable to other 
applications in power systems.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the background of the research reported in this dissertation is 
introduced first, then the objectives of this dissertation are listed, and the organization of 
this dissertation is given in the end. 
1.1 Introduction 
Adverse weather such as hurricanes can significantly affect the operation of 
power systems, and it can jeopardize system reliability. In recent years, the hurricanes in 
the United States have caused hundreds of thousands of customers losing power supply. 
Moreover, due to the interdependency of various infrastructural systems, even brief 
power interruption may affect communication, water distribution, traffic signaling, and 
other lifeline systems [1]-[3]. Predicting the impact of hurricanes on power system 
reliability can help utilities for better preparedness and make appropriate restoration 
arrangements [2]-[3].  
The impact of adverse weather on the reliability of power systems has been 
investigated in the past decades, i.e. the average effect of adverse weather over a long 
period of time. Some weather models have been proposed to evaluate power system 
reliability considering the effect of weather, e.g. two-state weather model [4] and three-
state weather model [5].  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. 
 2
When the effect of weather is considered, the states of the components of power 
systems can become dependent. For instance, when two-state weather model is used, 
usually a set of linear equations need to be solved by using Markov process [6]. 
However, this becomes impractical when applied to large power systems considering the 
fact that the number of system components is large. To solve this problem, usually 
Monte Carlo simulation can be used. But, due to its inherent nature of random 
experiments, simulation process can take long time to converge. In [6], Markov cut-set 
method was proposed to simplify the analytical approach. Its basic idea is that Markov 
process can be only applied to system minimal cut-sets as well as their unions, and its 
application to all system components is unnecessary. Although this method was 
described for some simple transmission configurations, it has not been developed for 
application to composite power systems, especially the nodal indices. 
In this dissertation, algorithms are developed to implement Markov cut-set 
method and simulation method to evaluate the impact of adverse weather on the long-
term reliability of composite power systems including system and nodal indices [7]. The 
obtained results by using different methods are compared and analyzed [7]. 
Usually, hurricanes last only a few days but their effect is drastic. Thus, the 
short-term impact of hurricanes, i.e. their dynamic impact during their durations, need to 
be investigated as their impact may not be reflected properly in the long term indices. 
Since a composite power system covers a large area, the weather models in [4]-[5] are 
not applicable and instead the regional weather model proposed in [8]-[9] can be used.  
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In this dissertation, the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of 
composite power systems is investigated and the common-cause failures of system 
components are also considered. A common-cause failure refers to the simultaneous 
failures of multiple components due to a common cause [10], e.g. those of transmission 
lines installed on a same tower.  
It has been known for a long time that the failure rate of a transmission or a 
distribution line is a function of the weather that it is exposed to and the failure rate of 
the transmission (distribution) line can be much higher in adverse weather than that in 
normal weather [11]. In this dissertation, a fuzzy inference system combined with 
regional weather model is used to assess the failure rate increment of system components 
cause by hurricanes. Additionally, different methods are proposed to build different 
types of fuzzy inference systems [12]-[14]. After the incremental failure rates of system 
components are obtained, short-term minimal cut-set method is proposed to compute the 
time-specific system and nodal reliability indices of composite power systems [13]. 
Here, only the independent failures of system components are considered. 
Next, two methods are proposed to investigate the impact of hurricanes on the 
short-term reliability of composite power systems including common-cause failures 
[15]-[16]. One of them uses a Bayesian network to alleviate the dimensionality problem 
of conditional probability method when numerous common-cause failures are modeled 
[15]; the other method extends minimal cut-set method to accommodate common-cause 
failures [16]. The obtained results by using the two methods are compared and the 
difference is analyzed [16].  
 4
Finally, it is shown that the evaluation methods proposed in this dissertation are 
also applicable to distribution systems [17] and other applications [18], e.g. operational 
reliability, and intermittent renewable energy.  
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this dissertation are as follows: 
1) Investigate the impact of adverse weather on the long-term reliability of composite 
power systems. The evaluation results can be used in power system planning. 
2) Investigate the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite power 
systems. The evaluation results can be used in power system operation. 
3) Investigate the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite power 
systems including the common-cause failures of components. Thus, the impact of 
hurricanes on the operational reliability of composite power systems can be predicted 
more accurately.  
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter II,  basic concepts of power 
system reliability and some weather models are introduced; in Chapter III, the 
investigation of the impact of adverse weather on the long-term reliability of composite 
power systems is presented; in Chapter IV, the investigation of the impact of hurricanes 
on the short-term reliability of composite power systems is presented; in Chapter V, the 
investigation of the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability including the 
common-cause failures of components is presented; finally, in Chapter VI, the 
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evaluation methods proposed in this dissertation is summarized and their possible 
extensions are discussed. 
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CHAPTER II 
POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY EVALUATION 
 
In this chapter, some basic concepts of power system reliability are introduced 
first; then, two models to consider the effect of weather are introduced.  
2.1 Basics of Power System Reliability 
Generally, reliability is defined as the ability of a system or component to 
perform its required functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time [19]. 
A key element of this definition is that the concerned system or component should 
operate under stated conditions.  Operational environment such as weather is such a 
condition which should be addressed in reliability evaluation. The effect of adverse 
weather on power systems and other infrastructural systems are introduced in the next 
section. 
For power systems, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
defines reliability as “the degree to which the performance of the elements of [the 
electrical] system results in power being delivered to customers within accepted 
standards and in the amount desired.” Actually, NERC’s definition of reliability includes 
two concepts: adequacy and security. Adequacy is defined as “the ability of the system 
to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the consumers at all 
times.” NERC defines security as “the ability of the system to withstand sudden 
disturbance.” In other words, adequacy refers to that sufficient system resources are 
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available to meet predicted load with reserve for contingencies; security refers to that the 
system remains reliable even in contingent cases.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Functional Zones and Hierarchical Levels 
 
 
It is noted that most present probabilistic techniques for power system reliability 
evaluation are used for adequacy assessment. The available probabilistic techniques to 
assess the security of power systems are limited. Accordingly, most reliability indices 
used at the present time are adequacy indices. 
The reliability evaluation can be implemented in different segments of a power 
system, i.e. functional zones, as well as the combinations of them which shapes the 
hierarchical levels shown in Fig. 1 [20]. 
The evaluation methods at different hierarchical levels of a power system can be 
different. For instance, at hierarchical level II the configuration of a transmission system 
is usually in a meshed fashion, and the effects of load flow, overload alleviation, 
generation rescheduling need to be considered. In contrast, at hierarchical level III the 
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configuration of a distribution system is usually radial. Thus, power flow is usually not 
considered in distribution systems. Generally, the evaluation methods for power system 
reliability fall into two categories: analytical and simulation. The details of the 
algorithms to implement them are described in the following chapters. Clearly, the 
reliability assessment at hierarchical level III becomes very complex as it involves all 
three functional zones. Thus, the distribution system is usually analyzed as a separate 
part. 
In this dissertation, the impact of hurricanes is investigated at hierarchical level II 
which is usually called a composite power system or a bulk power system. But, the 
proposed evaluation methods in this dissertation are also applicable to distribution 
systems. This is discussed in detail in Chapter VI. 
2.2 Weather Models 
2.2.1 Two-state weather model 
In [4], each transmission line was assumed to operate in a two-state fluctuating 
environment as shown in Fig. 2, and Markov method for the whole transmission system 
was used to evaluate its reliability. In Fig. 2, the arrows represent the transition of 
component states. For simplicity, only the transition of the states of one component is 
illustrated.  
Advantages of two-state weather model are its simplicity and easy 
implementation. This weather model can be used for long-term applications in power 
systems, e.g. power system planning. In this dissertation, it is used to evaluate the impact 
of adverse weather on the long-term reliability of composite power systems. But, for a 
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composite power system the number of components is large, and applying Markov 
process to all components is impractical. In this dissertation, Markov cut-set method in 
[6] is used to solve this problem. The details are given in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Two-State Weather Model (Simplified) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Regional Weather Model 
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2.2.2 Regional weather model  
An assumption adopted by previous weather model is that all system components 
are exposed to the same weather at a time. This is not true considering the fact that 
hurricanes develop and dissipate over time, i.e. the impact of hurricanes on a power 
system can be different temporally and spatially. 
In [8]-[9], the regional weather model as shown in Fig. 3 was used to recognize 
the regional effects of weather that transmission lines are exposed to and Monte-Carlo 
simulation was used to evaluate the reliability of composite power systems. 
In [2]-[3], similar regional weather model was applied to distribution systems 
and statistical regression method was used to predict the number of outages caused by 
hurricanes in each geographic unit.  
2.2.3 Disaster impact on infrastructural systems  
The impact of adverse weather on other infrastructural systems has been 
investigated in the literature. For instance, in [21]   a regional weather model similar to 
that in [2]-[3] was used to evaluate the performance of cellular networks during 
hurricanes. Moreover, the impact of other natural disasters on power systems has been 
investigated. For instance, in [22] simulation method was used to investigate the 
restoration process of power systems after earthquakes. 
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CHAPTER III 
RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF COMPOSITE POWER SYSTEMS 
USING MARKOV CUT-SET METHOD 
 
The impact of adverse weather on the long-term reliability of power systems 
have been investigated during the past decades. Usually, two-state weather model [4] is 
used to evaluate the effects of fluctuating weather on power system reliability. As a 
result, the states of system components are not independent anymore. To solve this 
problem, usually simulation method can be used. In this chapter, Markov cut-set method 
[6] is used to achieve the same goal and algorithms to implement this method are 
developed. For the purpose of comparison, algorithm to implement sequential simulation 
is also developed, and the results obtained by using the two methods are compared and 
analyzed. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.1 relevant researches using 
two-state weather model are reviewed; in Section 3.2 the assumptions adopted in this 
chapter are listed; in Section 3.3 minimal cut-set method is briefly introduced and the 
developed algorithms for Markov cut-set method are presented; in Section 3.4 Monte 
Carlo simulation is briefly introduced and the developed algorithm for sequential 
simulation is presented; in Section 3.5 the analytical and simulation methods proposed 
are applied to the modified IEEE reliability test system (RTS). The results obtained by 
using the two methods are presented and compared; finally, in Section 3.6 main 
conclusions obtained in this chapter are summarized.  
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3.1 Literature Review 
In the reliability evaluation of power systems, usually the states of system 
components are assumed to be independent, and system reliability indices are calculated 
by using the methods based on the multiplication rule of probabilities [23]. But, in some 
cases, for instance, when the effect of fluctuating weather or common-cause failures is 
considered, the previous assumption is invalid. The main weather models used include 
two-state weather model [4] and its variant [5]. Generally, two kinds of methods can be 
adopted, namely analytical [4], [6], [23] and Monte Carlo simulation [24].   
Generally, simulation method mimics the operational process of a physical 
system by using random experiments and obtains system reliability indices using 
statistical inference. Generally speaking, simulation method is suitable when complex 
system operational conditions are considered. In [24], basically two kinds of simulation 
methods are described: random sampling and sequential simulation. Generally, random 
sampling assumes that component states are independent and system states, i.e. the 
combinations of component states, are uncorrelated.  Sequential simulation is more 
flexible and is suitable to simulate the effect of fluctuating weather. Relevant details are 
given in Section 3.4.  
However, by the nature of simulation method, its convergence may need 
acceleration by using other techniques [24]. On the other hand, the Markov process used 
in [4] is accurate within the distribution assumptions, but it is only applicable to 
relatively small systems considering that the solution of 2 1+n  linear equations is required 
[6]. Here, n is the number of system components.  
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To alleviate the dimensionality problem, a method was proposed in [23] to 
reduce the state space by merging system states and systematically deleting low 
probability states. In [6], Markov cue-set method was proposed to evaluate the reliability 
of transmission and distribution systems considering the effects of fluctuating weather. 
In [6], minimal cut-set method was used to compute system reliability indices, and 
Markov process was applied to the components of a minimal cut-set or a union of 
minimal cut-sets to alleviate the computational burden. Markov cue-set method is based 
on the concept that if two-state weather model is used, the reliability indices of a 
minimal cut-set or a union of minimal cut-sets can be calculated by applying Markov 
process only to its members, and the application of Markov process to all system 
components simultaneously is unnecessary. Thus, if the minimal cut-sets up to some 
order (e.g. third-order, i.e. the maximum number of components) are determined, only a 
limited number of linear equations need to be solved at a time. For example, considering 
a system of 500 components, if the entire system is to be modeled by using Markov 
process, there will be 2501  number of states and thus as many equations to be solved. 
However, if the maximum number of the components in a minimal cut-set or a union of 
minimal cut-sets is say 6, then by using Markov cut-set method, the highest number of 
equations to be solved at a time is 27 . This can make the difference in the practical 
applicability of Markov process. 
However, in [6] Markov cut-set method was applied to a simple 5-component 
system, and the minimal cut-sets were determined by using simple enumeration method 
and the connectivity criterion in transmission and distribution systems. Additionally, 
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nodal reliability indices were not computed, and the comparison with simulation method 
was not given in [6]. 
In this chapter, Markov cut-set method is used to investigate the impact of 
adverse weather on the long-term reliability of composite power systems. From previous 
discussion, it is clear that a key step of Markov cut-set method is the identification of 
minimal cut-sets.  In this dissertation, this is modeled as a linear constrained 
optimization problem to shorten computational time. Since enumerating all minimal cut-
sets of a power system is impractical and unnecessary, the algorithm of computing the 
bounds of minimal cut-sets is also developed. An important new feature is the method 
for computing nodal indices as these indices are important for assessing the impact of 
adverse weather as well as extensions to distribution systems. 
3.2 Assumptions 
In this chapter, the following assumptions are adopted: 
1) Voltage is assumed as 1pu at each bus and DC power flow is used. 
2) The distribution of state residence times is assumed exponential. Thus, Markov 
process can be used to compute reliability indices. 
3) All reliability indices computed are steady state indices. Thus, the probability of a 
system state can be obtained by using the steady state condition of Markov process. 
4) All system components have two possible states: success or failure. 
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3.3 Markov Cut-Set Method 
 In this section, the developed algorithms for implementing Markov cut-set 
method are presented in detail. Firstly, minimal cut-set method is briefly introduced; 
then, the algorithm for identifying system and nodal minimal cut-sets is presented; 
finally, the algorithm for computing the bounds of minimal cut-sets is presented. 
3.3.1 Minimal cut-set method 
A cut set is a set of components whose failures alone could cause system failure. 
Here, the definition of system failure is rather broad and it can be any kind of anomaly 
defined. In this dissertation, system failure refers to the load shedding at any node of a 
composite power system. A minimal cut-set has the further property that it has no proper 
subset of components whose failures alone could cause system failure. Here, the term 
“component” is also used in a broad sense. It can be any device in a power system and 
even can be a condition or a function whose presence or absence could cause system 
failure.  
The basic idea of minimal cut-set method is to first identify the minimal cut-sets 
of a power system, and then use the following equations of probabilities to compute the 
reliability indices [6].  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CCCpCCCpCCpCpp mm
kji
kji
ji
ji
i
if ILIILIII 21
11 ⋅−+−∑+∑−∑= +
<<<
            
(1) 
( ) ( ) ( ) LIII −⋅∑+⋅∑−⋅∑= ++
<<
+
<
µµµ kji
kji
kjijiji
jii
i
if CCCpCCpCpf    
( ) ( ) µ mmm CCCp ++++ ⋅⋅−+ LILII 212111     (2) 
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fpd fff =                                                              (3)                                                   
where  
         p f                 =            failure probability   
         C i          =              minimal cut-set i 
         C i                  =    event that all members of C i  fail 
         CC ji I          =    joint event that all members of both C i  and C j  fail 
          m         =     number of minimal cut-sets 
f f           =    failure frequency   
µ i           =   repair rate of component i 
µi         =  ∑
∈Cii
iµ  
µ ji+         =  ∑
∈ CC jii
i
U
µ  
d f           =    mean duration of failure 
In practice, enumerating all the minimal cut-sets of a power system and using 
(1)-(3) to compute the exact values of reliability indices are impractical and unnecessary. 
Instead, the minimal cut-sets are usually determined up to a desired order and the 
following equations are used to compute the bounds of the reliability indices to 
approximate the results of (1)-(3): 
( )∑=
i
i
u
f Cpp                       (4)    
    ( ) ( )∑−∑=
< ji
ji
i
i
l
f CCpCpp I           (5)                                                   
( ) µi
i
i
u
f Cpf ⋅∑=                                       (6)  
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( ) ( ) µµ jiji jiii ilf CCpCpf +< ⋅∑−⋅∑= I                                           (7)                                          
where  
puf   = first upper bound of p f  
plf  = first lower bound of p f  
 f uf   = first upper bound of f f  
f lf  = first lower bound of f f  
 By using inclusion-exclusion formula, a sequence of increasingly closer bounds of the 
reliability indices can be obtained [25].  
Following the above introduction, Markov cut-set method can be implemented as 
follows:  
1) Determine the minimal cut-sets up to the preset order and the ones of higher order are 
ignored.  
2) Compute the reliability indices of the minimal cut-sets and their unions. Here, the 
multiplication rule of probabilities is not applicable anymore. Instead, the algorithm 
developed in Subsection 3.3.4 can be used. 
3) Use (3)-(7) to compute the reliability indices.  
3.3.2 Identification of minimal cut-sets  
In the literature, numerous methods have been proposed to generate minimal cut-
sets to evaluate the reliability of large complex systems [26]-[34]. However, these graph-
based methods mainly explore the connectivity feature of networks and are not suitable 
for the reliability evaluation of composite power systems considering the capacity and 
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admittance of transmission lines. In [31], [33], although the link capacity of networks 
were considered, the proposed algorithms are only suitable for some general networks 
considering the fact that generation rescheduling and load shedding have to be 
considered in composite power systems. In [29], although the proposed method was 
implemented in power systems, the previous issues were not addressed.  
Normally, a composite power system can be modeled as a capacitated-flow 
network subjected to some operational constraints, such as generation-load balance, 
generator capacity limits and voltage magnitude limits. In reliability evaluation, usually 
the analysis of failure effects should be implemented after the occurrence of a system 
event, i.e. determining the resultant system state is success or failure as defined. In a 
composite power system, after a system event occurs, e.g. the outage of a generator or 
the tripping of a transmission line, usually the output of generators is rescheduled first. If 
the violation of system constraints cannot be remedied, usually load shedding is finally 
executed.  
In this dissertation, the identification of minimal cut-sets is modeled as a 
constrained linear optimization problem to reduce computational time. When the voltage 
is considered, the proposed algorithm can be easily extended to the AC model. 
Mathematically, the objective is to minimize the amount of load shedding M D  if 
necessary and meantime the following constraints are satisfied: 
Balance of active power flow:  
PPP LDDG −=                                                        (8) 
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where  
PG   =  active power of total generator output 
PD  =  active power of system load 
PLD   = active power of total load shedding   
Transmission line capacity limit: 
PP jiji max,, ≤                                                           (9)             
where  
P ji ,  =  active power flow in transmission line from bus i to j 
 P jimax,   =  upper limit of P ji ,  
Generator capacity limit: 
PP gg max≤                                               (10) 
where  
Pg   =  active power output of generator g  
Pgmax   =  upper limit of Pg  
Load shedding limit: 
PP dd
max≤                                                       (11) 
where  
Pd   =  active power shedding of load d  
Pd
max
  =  upper limit of Pd  
The algorithm to determine the minimal cut-sets of a composite power system up 
to the preset order is as follows: 
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1) Choose an n-order arbitrary combination of system components. 
2) Check all the existing lower-order minimal cut-sets to examine if they are the subsets 
of the combination in Step (1): if yes, go back to Step (1); if not, go to the next step. 
3) Run the optimization routine on the condition that these n components are out of 
service simultaneously. 
4) Examine if load shedding is needed: if yes, these components make up an n-order 
minimal cut-set; otherwise, not.  
5) Check if all the n-order combinations of system components have been examined: if 
not, go back to Step (1); if yes, forward to the next step. 
6) Check if the pre-set order of the combinations is reached: if yes, stop; if not, forward 
to the next step. 
7) Set 1+= nn  and go back to Step (1). 
The proposed algorithm has some advantages as follows: 
1) The implementation is simple. Since linear optimization is widely used in various 
applications in power systems, the proposed algorithm can be implemented by 
slightly modifying the current software.  
2) It is easy to extend this algorithm to incorporate more system operational 
considerations. For instance, it is simple to extend it to the AC model. 
3) It is easy to compare the proposed algorithm with other methods since linear 
optimization is also used in other analytical and simulation methods to analyze the 
failure effects. For example, the number of calling the optimization routine can 
indicate the efficiency of a reliability evaluation method.   
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4) It can be used to compute system and nodal reliability indices. Although simulation 
method can achieve the same goal, the computation may be more expensive. This is 
discussed in detail in the next subsection. 
However, a practical composite power system may have a large number of 
components. Even if the minimal cut-sets are determined to a small order, their number 
can be still very large. This problem can be further alleviated by using the approaches 
proposed in [35]. The basic idea is that using learning methods to classify system states 
as success or failure. Thus, the computational time can be reduced further. It should be 
pointed out that this problem is shared by analytical and simulation methods. Some 
intelligent methods can accelerate the algorithms of both of them. 
3.3.3 System and nodal minimal cut-sets  
As mentioned previously, the proposed algorithm can identify nodal minimal cut-
sets too. Actually, it can identify system and nodal minimal cut-sets simultaneously. 
Thus, the computation of nodal reliability indices can be much simplified.  
When a minimal cut-set is determined, the information about the nodes which 
suffer loss of load is saved. Thus, in the end there are two lists, first a list of all minimal 
cut-sets and then an additional list of nodes that have loss of load corresponding to each 
minimal cut-set. To compute system reliability indices, all the minimal cut-sets are used, 
i.e. they are system minimal cut-sets. To compute the reliability indices of a node, only 
those minimal cut-sets which have it suffering loss of load are used, i.e. they are the 
nodal minimal cut-sets. It should be pointed out that most of the computation time is 
spent in identifying the minimal cut-sets. The time taken by the computation of (3)-(7) is 
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relatively small. Since the nodal minimal cut-set are the subsets of system minimal cut-
sets, no additional time is needed for nodal reliability indices as far as the identification 
of minimal cut-sets is concerned. The only additional time needed is for the use of (3)-
(7) for the calculation of nodal reliability indices and this is not significant. This point 
will be further illustrated in Section 3.6. 
When simulation method is used to obtain nodal reliability indices, as pointed out 
in the above discussion, a system failure may have different effects at different nodes, 
i.e. it may only have some nodes suffering loss of load. Usually, for a power system the 
number of system states which are success is much greater than that of system states 
which are failure. Considering the fact that the number of system states that cause a node 
suffering loss of load is smaller than that of system states which are failure, the converge 
of simulation method is slower to simulate nodal reliability indices than that simulating 
system reliability indices. 
3.3.4 Calculation of probabilities  
Another key step of implementing Markov cue-set method is to compute the 
probabilities of a minimal cut-set or a union of minimal cut-sets. In this subsection, an 
improved algorithm is developed to compute the bounds of the reliability indices. This 
algorithm can automatically generate the transition rate matrix of a minimal cut-set or a 
union of minimal cut-sets, thus the computation of system and nodal reliability indices 
can be much easier. This algorithm is an improvement of the method proposed in [36]. 
The improvements are summarized as follows: 
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1) Although the algorithm in [36] is applicable to n-component system, it is different 
from that in this dissertation. The index n in [36] is 'fixed' whereas in this chapter n is  
'variable'. In other words, the algorithm in [36] is applicable to fixed-dimension 
problems whereas the algorithm developed here is applicable to variable-dimension 
problems. This is needed as the number of the components of a minimal cut-set or a 
union of minimal cut-sets keeps on changing.  
2) The algorithm in [36] is for single-state weather model whereas in this chapter the 
algorithm is applicable to two-state weather model considering the effects of 
fluctuating weather. Thus, the transition rate matrix produced here comprises four 
sub-matrices, and they are generated in sequential steps and finally all the diagonal 
elements are updated.  
3) The core parts of two algorithms are different. The core part of the algorithm in [36] 
is based on “number” processing whereas in this chapter it is based on “bit” 
processing. Relevant details are given in the following discussion. 
To illustrate the proposed algorithm to compute the bounds of the reliability 
indices, a simple example is given first. Here, the two-state weather model in Chapter II 
for a single component is used. It is reproduced in Fig. 4. and necessary parameters are 
added.  
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Fig. 4: Two-State Weather Model (Parameterized) 
 
 
here 
λn   =  failure rate in normal weather 
 µ n   =  repair rate in normal weather 
 λa   = failure rate in adverse weather 
 µ a   = repair rate in adverse weather 
 na  =  transition rate from normal weather to adverse weather 
 an  = transition rate from adverse weather to normal weather 
In this chapter, the impact of adverse weather on the long-term reliability of 
composite power systems is of interest. Thus, the steady state condition of Markov 
process can be used to compute the probabilities, i.e. the following equation can be 
obtained. 
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where,  
Pnup   = success probability in normal weather 
Pndown    =  failure probability in normal weather 
Paup   = success probability in adverse weather 
Padown    = failure probability in adverse weather 
However, the above equations cannot be directly solved to compute the probabilities 
because they are linearly correlated, i.e. they are not independent. Now, we have the 
following equation: 
1=+++ PPPP adown
a
up
n
down
n
up        (13) 
Then, we can replace say the fourth row of (12) as follows: 
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Now, the above equations can be solved appropriately to compute the probabilities. The 
previous discussion shows that a key step to compute the probabilities is to generate the 
transition rate matrix. 
For a minimal cue-set or a union of minimal cue-sets, generally the following 
equation can be used to compute the steady state probabilities:  
BPA =′
                                                                 (15)   
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where  
A′
  =  obtained from 





=
AANA
ANNN
A  by replacing the elements of an  
  arbitrary row k by summing vector 1 
 NN = 22 nn ×  transition rate matrix in normal weather 
AA = 22 nn ×  transition rate matrix in adverse weather 
NA = 22 nn ×  transition rate matrix from normal weather to adverse  
  weather 
AN  =  22 nn ×  transition rate matrix from adverse weather to normal  
  weather 
 n  =  order of a minimal cut-set or a union of minimal cut-sets 
P  = a column vector whose ith element is the steady state probability  
  of system state i 
B  =  a vector of zeros with the kth element set to 1 
Actually, only the sum of the state probabilities in two weathers which correspond to the 
minimal cut-set or the union of minimal cut-sets, needs to be calculated. 
 Next, the algorithm to generate matrix A is presented in detail. The basic idea is 
as follows:  
1) Generate the transition rate sub-matrices in different weathers. 
 2) Generate the transition rate sub-matrices between two weathers. 
3) Update the transition rate sub-matrices in Step(1). 
Generating NN 
    NN is a sub-matrix whose elements are as follows: 
NN ii,   = ∑−
j
ijNN ,  
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NN ji,   = λn ij,  
λn ji,   =  transition rate from system state i to j in normal weather 
The algorithm used to determine λ ji,  is as follows: for NN the number of system states 
is 2n  and each system state is represented by an n-bit binary vector on the principle - for 
each bit the binary number is 1 or 0 if the state of the corresponding component is 
success or failure.  
1) Firstly, number 321L
n
000
 is assigned to state 1. From state 2 to 12 −n , the binary 
representation of each system state is as follows:  
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 Finally, vector 321L
n
111
 is assigned to state 2n . 
2) From system state i to j, if there is one and only one bit of their binary vectors being 
different, forward to the next step; if not, 0
,
=λ ji . Here only the change of the state 
of one component at a time is considered, i.e. common-mode failures are not 
considered.  
3) Suppose that the change of the state takes place at the lth bit of two binary vectors: if 
it is 10 → , µλ lji =, ; otherwise, λλ lji =, . 
4) If all the pairs of system states are examined, stop; if not, go back to Step (2). 
Generating AA 
AA is a sub-matrix whose elements are as follows:  
AA ii,   = ∑−
j
ijAA ,  
AA ji,   = λa ij,  
λa ji,    =  transition rate from system state i to j in adverse weather 
The algorithm to generate AA is the same as that to obtain NN except that the transition 
rates in adverse weather are used instead. 
Generating NA and AN  
Both NA and AN are diagonal sub-matrices and they are easy to produce. NA is a 
sub-matrix whose elements are as follows: 
NA ii,   = λ AN →  
λ AN →   =  transition rate from normal weather to adverse weather 
 29
AN is a sub-matrix whose elements are as follows: 
 AN ii,   = λ NA→  
λ NA→   = transition rate from adverse weather to normal weather  
Update NN and AA 
Finally, NN and AA are updated as: NANNNN +=  and ANAAAA += . 
In previous discussion, the relevant reliability parameters, i.e. the transition rates,   
are assumed to be known. Here, these parameters can be obtained as follows.  
Parameters in different weathers 
 Usually, average reliability parameters are ready to use or can be easily obtained 
by using simple conversion. For example, usually the mean time to failure or mean time 
to repair of a component is known. Then, the failure rate or repair rate is just the 
reciprocal of mean time to failure or mean time to repair. But, the average reliability 
parameters are undistinguished in different weathers. In the next chapter, a simple 
approach is proposed to differentiate the reliability parameters in different weathers.  
Parameters between two weathers 
These parameters can be obtained by using a method similar to that obtaining the 
average parameters, i.e. computing the reciprocal of mean time in normal weather or 
mean time in adverse weather to obtain the corresponding transition rate. 
3.4 Simulation Method 
In this section, the algorithm to simulate the impact of fluctuating weather on 
composite power system reliability is presented. Firstly, the basic concepts of sequential 
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simulation are introduced; then, the proposed simulation algorithm is presented; finally, 
some possible improvements to simulation method are discussed.   
3.4.1 Sequential simulation 
Generally, the evaluation techniques of power system reliability fall into two 
categories: analytical and simulation. Analytical method is usually based on some 
mathematical models and calculates reliability results using mathematical derivation. 
Basically, analytical method enumerates some dominant system states in state space 
which have non-trivial probabilities. In contrast, simulation method usually does not 
depend on specific mathematical models. Instead, it simulates the operational process of 
a physical system, and repeat the simulation till termination criterion is satisfied. Finally, 
the reliability indices are obtained by using statistical inference [37].  
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, basically there are two main 
simulation techniques: random sampling and sequential simulation [24]. The major 
difference of these two methods is as follows: random sampling assumes that component 
states are independent and consecutive simulations are also independent with each other; 
in contrast, sequential simulation simulates system operation literally over time. 
Actually, this method simulates a Markov chain chronologically. Thus, it is more 
flexible than random sampling and it is used to simulate the effects of adverse weather 
on the reliability of composite power systems in this chapter.  
Generally, there are two methods to control the advance of sequential simulation: 
fixed time interval method and next event method [24]. Fixed time interval method 
advances the simulation in step of a constant time interval t∆ . Next event method 
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advances the simulation in a temporal sequence which is determined by the occurrence 
order of system events. Here, a system event refers to the change of the state of a 
component or weather. In this chapter, the next event method is used. 
A main step of sequential simulation is to generate the random residence time of 
a component at a state and then determine the next most imminent event. The former 
issue is discussed next and the latter issue is explained in Subsection 3.4.4. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Function Inversion 
 
 
To generate the random time that a component resides at a state, usually the 
function inversion approach as shown in Fig. 5 can be used [24]. In this chapter, the 
residence time of component state is exponentially distributed. Firstly, a random number 
within [ ]1,0  is generated; then, the value of the corresponding residence time on the 
 32
horizontal axis can be obtained by inversing the exponential function.  Mathematically, 
the cumulative distribution function of an exponential distribution is as follows: 
eP tα−−= 1           (16) 
here, 
α  =  rate parameter 
Then, the residence time can be computed as follows: 
( )
α
P
t
−
−=
1ln
         (17) 
When α is replaced by failure rate λ or repair rate µ , the residence time of a component 
at success state or failure state can be obtained accordingly. 
3.4.2 Estimation and convergence 
As in the analytical method, here frequency and duration indices are simulated. 
An advantage of sequential simulation is that the estimation of reliability indices is 
simpler than that in random sampling. The estimates of p f , f f  are as follows: 
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where,  
p f  = estimate of p f   
f f  = estimate of f f  
N  = a sufficiently large number (e.g. the number of years)  
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T i  = system failure time during the ith cycle  
f i  =  system failure frequency during the ith cycle (e.g. the frequency  
   from success to failure) 
Then, the mean duration of system failure d f  can be computed as follows: 
f
P
d
f
f
f =                                                                  (20)                                         
Apparently, ( )TEp if =  and ( )fEf if = . 
In this dissertation, the coefficient of variation of an estimate is used to terminate 
the simulation, i.e. when it is less than a preset value. The coefficients of variation of 
p f , f f  are as follows: 
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where,  
COV p   = coefficient of variation of p f   
COV f   = coefficient of variation of f f   
 
( )pVar f  = variance of p f    
( )fVar f  = variance of f f    
 
( )pVar f  = variance of p f    
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( )fVar f  = variance of f f   
( )pVar f   = estimate of ( )pVar f  and is equal to ( )∑ −
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3.4.3 Confidence interval  
As discussed previously, T i , f i   are random variables and their expected values 
are p f , f f  respectively. Now, suppose that their variances are σ 2T , σ 2f  respectively. 
Then, their sample variances are as follows: 
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where, 
 ST2  = sample variances of T i  
S f
2
 = sample variances of f i  
Then, 
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 have t-distribution [23], and the ( )α−1%100  
confidence intervals of p f , f f are as follows: 
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where,  
A 2α  = ( )th21100 α−  percentile of t-distribution 
Actually, confident interval is an interval estimation in contrast to the point estimation 
introduced in the last subsection, and it can provide another perspective on the estimates. 
3.4.4 Simulation algorithm 
The algorithm of sequential simulation to assess the effects of fluctuating 
weather is as follows: 
1) Each system state is represented by an (n+1)-bit binary vector. From bit 1 to n, each 
binary number is 1 or 0 if the state of the corresponding component is success or 
failure. The last bit indicates the state of weather and it is 1 or 0 if weather is normal 
or adverse. 
2) For an arbitrary combination of n+1 binary numbers, examine the last bit: if it is 1, 
the transition rates of all components in normal weather are used; otherwise, the 
transition rates of all components in adverse weather are used. 
3) Compare the residence times of all components and weather at their current states, 
and the smallest one determines the next most imminent event. Here, the change of 
weather state is also treated as an event. 
4) Update all residence times on the principle: each one minus the smallest one, and the 
one being 0 will get a new time. 
5) Check the type of the event: if it is the change of the state of weather, go back to 
Step (2); if it is the change of the state of a component, go to the next step.  
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6) After the event has happened, check if the obtained system state is failure (here the 
same criterion as that in the analytical method is used): if true, the corresponding 
event time is saved; otherwise, go to the next step directly. 
7) Check if the system state before this event is failure: if false, the transition of system 
state is counted; otherwise, go to the next step directly. 
8) Update all values: estimates, coefficients of variation, confidence intervals. 
9) Check if termination criterion is matched: if true, stop; if not, go back to Step (1). 
3.4.5 Possible improvements 
 As in the analytical method, most of the computational time is spent on analyzing 
failure effects, i.e. determining a system state is failure or not. This can be improved by 
using the methods mentioned in the last section. Due to the characteristics of simulation 
method, there are two other improvements which can be implemented. One is that some 
intelligent methods can be used to improve the selection of system states [24]; the other 
is that variance reduction method can be used to accelerate the convergence of 
simulation [23].   
3.5 Implementation 
In this section, the analytical and simulation methods proposed are applied to the 
modified IEEE reliability test system [38], and the results obtained by using the two 
methods are compared and analyzed.  
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Fig. 6: IEEE Reliability Test System [39] 
 
 
3.5.1 Test system 
The single-line diagram of IEEE reliability test system is shown in Fig. 6. There 
are 32 generators ranging from 12 MW to 400MW, 24 buses, and 38 transmission lines 
and transformers. The transmission part of the test system generally consists of two 
voltage levels: 138 KV and 230 KV.  
 38
Considering that the transmission part of the test system is relatively over-
reliable [40]-[41], the test system is modified as: the installed capacities of all generators 
and the load at each bus are increased 1.5 times. Accordingly, the annual peak load 4275 
MW is used as the system load, i.e. the system load is constant. But, the proposed 
methods are also applicable when varied system load is used. Additionally, for the 
purpose of illustration, all the generators in Table 7 and all the transmission lines in 
Table 11 in [38] are assigned integer numbers starting from 1 in an ascending order 
respectively. In this dissertation, the relevant data of IEEE reliability test system is listed 
in Appendix.  
3.5.2 System reliability indices 
 In this subsection, the system minimal cut-sets identified by using the proposed 
analytical method and the evaluation results obtained are presented. 
3.5.2.1 System minimal cut-sets 
Here, the minimal cut-sets are determined up to second-order. The minimal cut-
sets determined are as follows: first-order minimal cut-sets of generation and 
transmission parts, second-order minimal cut-sets of generation and transmission parts, 
and second-order mixed type which consists of a generator and a transmission line. A 
mixed minimal cut-set is represented in the form of {generator, transmission line}. The 
system minimal cut-sets determined are listed in Tables 1-3. It is pointed out that 
distinguishing the minimal cut-sets of different orders and different types in three tables 
is just for the purpose of illustration. In programming, actually they are processed 
indistinguishably as one table by using the algorithm developed in Section 3.3. 
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Table 1: System Minimal Cut-Sets (Generation) 
Type 1-Order 2-Order 
Generator None 
{12,13},{12,14},{13,14},{12,22},{13,22} 
{14,22},{20,22},{21,22},{12,23},{13,23} 
{14,23},{20,23},{21,23},{22,23},{22,30} 
{23,30}{22,31},{23,31},{12,32},{13,32} 
{14,32},{20,32}{21,32}{22,32},{23,32} 
{30,32},{31,32} 
 
 
 
Table 2: System Minimal Cut-Sets (Transmission) 
Type 1-Order 2-Order 
Transmission 
Lines 
{5},{10} 
{11} 
{1,7},{2,7},{6,7},{4,8},{3,9},{7,9} 
{12,13},{7,14},{7,15},{3,16},{7,16} 
{12,16},{15,16},{3,17},{7,17},{12,17} 
{15,17},{16,17},{7,18},{15,18},{17,18} 
{18,20},{7,21},{18,21},{20,21},{21,22} 
{7,23},{15,23},{17,23},{18,23},{19,23} 
{21,23},{1,27}{2,27},{6,27},{7,27} 
{8,27},{9,27},{14,27},{15,27},{16,27} 
{17,27}{18,27},{21,27},{23,27},{31,38} 
 
 
 
Table 3: System Minimal Cut-Sets (Mixed) 
Type 1-Order 2-Order 
Mixed N/A 
{7,1},{8,1},{1,7},{2,7},{3,7},{4,7} 
{5,7},{6,7},{7,7},{8,7},{12,7},{13,7} 
{14,7},{32,7},{32,25},{32,26},{1,27} 
{2,27},{3,27},{4,27},{5,27},{6,27} 
{7,27},{8,27},{12,27},{13,27},{14,27} 
{32,27},{32,29} 
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3.5.2.2 System reliability indices  
The system reliability indices and the computational time are listed in Table 4. 
The average value is the average of the upper and lower bounds. For simplicity, only the 
system reliability indices in normal weather are calculated. If the relevant data is 
available, the effects of adverse weather can be easily incorporated.  
3.5.3 Nodal reliability indices 
As discussed in Section 3.3, the proposed analytical method can also compute 
nodal reliability indices. The algorithm is the same as that computing system indices 
except that the nodal minimal cut-sets are used instead. For illustration, in Tables 5-7 the 
minimal cut-sets identified for bus 19 of the test system are listed. As mentioned in 
Section 3.3, the minimal cut-sets of bus 19 are the subsets of system minimal cut-sets. In 
Table 8, the reliability indices obtained at bus 19 are listed. The indices for all the nodes 
are listed in Table 9. For clarity, only the average values of p f
,
 f f  are computed. The 
computational time for system and all 20 bus indices is approximately 138 seconds as 
compared with the only system indices (Table 4) of 134 seconds. So, the additional 
computational time for the nodal indices is only about 4 seconds, about 3% of the time 
for the system indices. The reason, as explained earlier, is that the determination of 
minimal cut-sets where most CPU time is spent, is the same for the algorithms for 
computing system and nodal indices. 
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Table 4: Long-Term System Reliability Indices 
Index Upper Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Average 
Value 
p f  0.1443 0.0853 0.1148 
f f  ( /yr) 35.04 12.264 23.652 
d f  (yr) N/A 0.0049 
Computation 
time (s) 133.592 
 
 
Table 5: Minimal Cut-Sets of Bus19 (Generation) 
Type 1-Order 2-Order 
Generator None 
{12,13},{13,22}, {14,22},{20,22},{21,22} 
{12,23},{13,23},{14,23},{20,23},{21,23} 
{22,23},{22,30},{23,30}{22,31},{23,31} 
{12,32},{13,32},{14,32},{20,32}{21,32} 
{22,32},{23,32},{30,32},{31,32} 
 
 
Table 6: Minimal Cut-Sets of Bus 19 (Transmission) 
Type 1-Order 2-Order 
Transmission Lines {11} {4,8},{3,9},{19,23},{7,27},{31,38} 
 
 
Table 7: Minimal Cut-Sets of Bus 19 (Mixed) 
Type 1-Order 2-Order 
Mixed N/A {32,25},{32,26},{32,29} 
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Table 8: Reliability Indices at Bus 19 (Long-Term) 
Index Upper Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Mean 
Value 
p f  0.1333 0.0815 0.1074 
f f  ( /yr) 30.66 12.264 21. 4506 
d f  (yr) N/A 0.005 
 
 
 
Table 9: Long-Term Nodal Reliability Indices 
Bus p f  f f  (/yr) d f  (yr) 
1 0.1123 22.8456 0.0049 
2 0.1121 22.7399 0.0049 
3 0.0923 18.0322 0.0051 
4 0.1122 22.8178 0.0049 
5 0.1122 22.8213 0.0049 
6 0.0339 5.1403 0.0066 
7 0.0002 0.1966 0.001 
8 0.0998 19.6637 0.0051 
9 0.0321 4.3344 0.0074 
10 0.1121 22.7205 0.0049 
13 0.1122 22.8087 0.0049 
14 0.0398 6.9801 0.0057 
15 0.091 17.6535 0.0052 
16 0.1073 21.4319 0.005 
18 0.0908 17.4674 0.0052 
19 0.1074 21.4506 0.005 
20 0.1072 21.3369 0.005 
Computation time (s): 138.408 
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3.5.4 Simulation results  
 
 
Table 10: Simulation Results: Part 1 (Long-Term) 
Iteration up lp p f  uf( /yr) lf( /yr) f f  ( /yr) 
50 0.2013 0.0787 0.14 53.9589 18.4706 36.2147 
250 0.1649 0.1121 0.14 57.5648 33.4846 45.5247 
500 0.164 0.124 0.144 40.0002 26.4266 33.2134 
2500 0.1258 0.1094 0.1176 27.6618 22.2996 24.9807 
5000 0.1245 0.1127 0.1186 27.2848 23.4432 25.364 
 
 
Table 11: Simulation Results: Part 2 (Long-Term) 
Iteration p f  f f  (/yr) d f (yr) Computation time(s) 
50 0.14 36.2147 0.0039 3.01 
250 0.14 45.5247 0.0031 14.835 
500 0.144 33.2134 0.0043 29.796 
2500 0.1176 24.9807 0.0047 148.34 
5000 0.1186 25.364 0.0047 294.54 
 
 
The reliability indices obtained by using the simulation method are listed in 
Tables 10-11. Here, for clarity only the results after some number of iterations are listed. 
Here, the 90th percentile of t-distribution is used to compute the confidence intervals. 
Corresponding to the analytical results, only the reliability indices in normal weather are 
simulated. For simplicity, only the system reliability indices are simulated. But the 
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proposed algorithm is also applicable to simulating the nodal indices. The abbreviations 
used in Table 10 are as follows: 
up =  upper bound of the confidence interval of  p f  
lp =  lower bound of the confidence interval of  p f  
uf =  upper bound of the confidence interval of f f   
lf =  lower bound of the confidence interval of f f   
3.5.5 Comparison of results from two methods 
The results of the two methods are compared in Figs. 7-8. Here, the straight lines 
represent the bounds and the average value of the analytical results, and the curves 
represent the confidence intervals and the estimates of the simulation results. Here, the 
legends used are as follows: 
UBAM: upper bound of the analytical method 
LBAM: lower bound of the analytical method 
MVAM: mean value of the analytical method 
UBCI: upper bound of the confidence interval 
LBCI: lower bound of the confidence interval 
EFP: estimate of system failure probability  
EFF: estimate of system failure frequency  
From the comparison, the following conclusions can be made: 
1) The simulation results fall into the bounds of the analytical results, and the bounds of 
the analytical results is wider than the confidence intervals of the simulation results 
except in the beginning of the simulation. 
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Fig. 7: Long-Term System Failure Probability 
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Fig. 8: Long-Term System Failure Frequency 
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2) The average values of the analytical results fall into the confidence intervals of the 
simulation results, and they are close to the estimates of the simulation, i.e. the 
average values of the analytical results can approximate the system reliability indices 
and they are comparable to the simulation results.  
3) When the simulation is proceeding, the confidence intervals become narrower and 
the bounds of a confidence interval become parallel. Therefore, the variation 
tendency of the confidence intervals can be used as the termination criterion of the 
simulation, e.g. setting the difference of the bounds of a confidence interval being 
less than a small value. 
4) In this dissertation, no special technique is used to accelerate the convergence of the 
simulation. The comparison shows that in the current case the proposed analytical 
method is faster and comparable results can be obtained. 
5) In the current case, the computational time of the proposed analytical method is 
acceptable, and the additional computational burden in computing nodal reliability 
indices and storing corresponding data is not significant. For real-world applications, 
further investigation and improvements of implementation could be done. For 
instance, usually both analytical and simulation methods use linear optimization to 
analyze failure effects and this is time-consuming. Some heuristics combined with 
this approach can improve the performance of reliability evaluation methods. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, an improved analytical method is proposed to evaluate the impact 
of adverse weather on the reliability of composite power systems. This method proposes 
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an algorithm to identify system and nodal minimal cut-sets, and proposes an improved 
algorithm to compute the reliability indices of the bounds of minimal cut-sets. An 
algorithm for using sequential simulation to assess the effects of fluctuating weather is 
also developed. These two methods are applied to the modified IEEE reliability test 
system. The evaluation results obtained by using different methods are compared and 
analyzed. 
From the implementation, the following conclusions are made: 
1) The proposed analytical method is effective and efficient. In the current case, it is 
fast and the evaluation results can be comparable to those of the simulation method. 
2) The proposed analytical method has the advantages of easy implementation, 
convenience of incorporating more system operational considerations, and easy 
interpretation of the obtained results.  
3) The variation tendency of the confidence intervals can be used to terminate the 
simulation. 
4) The additional computational burden in computing nodal reliability indices and 
storing corresponding data is not significant. The reason is that the proposed 
analytical method can identify system and nodal minimal cut-sets simultaneously, 
and this process is time-consuming compared to the calculation of reliability indices.   
5) For real-world applications, further investigation and improvements of 
implementation could perhaps be done. For instance, some intelligent methods can 
be used to improve the performance of reliability evaluation techniques. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EVALUATION OF HURRICANE IMPACT ON THE SHORT-TERM RELIABILITY 
OF COMPOSITE POWER SYSTEMS  
 
In the last chapter, the impact of adverse weather on the long-term reliability of 
composite power systems is investigated. Typically, hurricanes only last a few days but 
their impact on life-line systems is drastic. Therefore, the impact of hurricanes on the 
short-term reliability of composite power systems needs to be investigated as their 
impact on the long term reliability is likely to be diluted. In this chapter, a methodology 
is proposed to investigate the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of 
composite power systems. Firstly, a fuzzy inference system is combined with regional 
weather model [8]-[9] to assess the effect of hurricanes on the failure rates of system 
components. Here,  different methods are used to build two types of fuzzy inference 
systems [12]-[14]. Then short-term minimal cut-set method is developed to compute 
time-specific system and nodal reliability indices [13], [17]. The proposed methodology 
is also applied to the modified IEEE reliability test system. The evaluation results 
obtained by using different methods are compared and analyzed. The implementation 
demonstrates that the proposed methodology is effective and efficient and is flexible in 
its applications [13]. 
 This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.1 relevant researches about the 
effect of weather on the short-term reliability of power systems are reviewed; in Section 
4.2 the overall evaluation scheme of the short-term reliability of composite power 
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systems affected by hurricanes is presented; in Section 4.3 the basic concepts of fuzzy 
sets and fuzzy inference systems are introduced; in Section 4.4 the different methods to 
build different fuzzy inference systems are presented; in Section 4.5 the main steps of 
short-term minimal cut-set method are presented; in Section 4.6 the proposed 
methodology is applied to the modified IEEE reliability test system; finally, in Section 
4.7 the main conclusions obtained in this chapter are summarized.  
4.1 Literature Review 
Many power system components, such as transmission and distribution lines, are 
exposed to external environment, and it can have a significant impact on the reliability 
parameters of system components. For instance, it is known for a long time that the 
failure rate of a transmission or a distribution line is a function of the weather that it is 
exposed to, and the failure rate of the transmission or distribution line can be much 
higher in adverse weather than that in normal weather [11]. Thus, one of the challenges 
of assessing the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite power 
systems is to evaluate how hurricanes affect the reliability parameters of system 
components, i.e. failure and repair rates.  
In [1], it was pointed out that there is rough correspondence between the severity 
level of hurricanes and the number of power outages. Since the failure rate of a 
component is close to its failure frequency, i.e. the number of outages during a period of 
time, the preceding observation can be interpreted that there is some functional 
relationship between the severity level of hurricanes and the failure rates of system 
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components. Thus, a regression method can be used to assess the relationship between 
them. 
In [42], the impact of vegetation on the failure rates of overhead distribution 
feeders was assessed by using some parametric methods and an artificial neural network. 
In [43], multiple linear regression was used to evaluate the impact of weather on the 
failure rates of transmission lines. In [44], a Bayesian network was used to assess the 
impact of weather on the failure rates of overhead distribution lines.  
In this dissertation, a fuzzy inference system is combined with regional weather 
model [8]-[9] to assess the functional relationship between the severity level of 
hurricanes and the failure rate increment of system components. Here, different methods 
are used to build two types of fuzzy inference systems [12]-[14]. These methods include 
artificial method and data-driven methods. An advantage of the proposed approach is 
that these methods can be used in different situations.  
After the incremental failure rates of system components are determined, the 
short-term reliability of composite power systems can be evaluated as follows. Firstly, 
the reliability indices of system components are calculated. The steady state results of 
Markov process are not suitable here and so the short-term indices need to be calculated. 
In this chapter, a method is proposed to use the minimal cut-set approach 
described in the previous chapter to evaluate the short-term reliability of composite 
power systems affected by hurricanes. Here, both system and nodal reliability indices 
can be computed.   
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4.2 Overall Evaluation Scheme 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: Short-Term Reliability Evaluation Scheme (Independent Failures) 
 
 
The overall scheme for investigating the impact of hurricanes on the short-term 
reliability of composite power systems is shown in Fig. 9. Generally, it consists of three 
steps: hurricane forecast, assessing the incremental component parameters, and system 
reliability evaluation. The relevant details are presented in the following subsections. 
Finally, the collection of required data for data-driven methods to build the fuzzy 
inference system is discussed.  
4.2.1 Hurricane impact  
A hurricane is a stormy weather which develops over large bodies of the oceans 
and then loses its strength after moving over land. Its main effects are strong wind and 
heavy rainfall when it moves over land. The movement track and strength of a hurricane 
can be forecast by using observation data and prediction model.  
Since hurricanes develop and dissipate with time, their impact on a composite 
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power system can be described in two aspects: temporal and spatial. Temporal refers to 
the fact that the impact of a hurricane in a given region is different at different times; 
spatial refers to the fact that that the impact of a hurricane is different in different 
regions at a given time. In this dissertation, the duration of a hurricane is partitioned into 
some small time intervals to investigate the temporal effects of hurricanes; the affected 
composite power system is partitioned into several regions to investigate the spatial 
effects of hurricanes. The temporal partition can be determined by the dissipation rate of 
the hurricane, and the spatial partition can be determined by the geographical conditions 
of the composite power system. 
The severity level of hurricanes can be represented by some defined parameters. 
In this dissertation, wind speed and rainfall are used as two parameters of hurricanes. It 
is noted that in a given region, the parameters of hurricanes are assumed to be identical.  
4.2.2 Fuzzy inference 
In this dissertation, a fuzzy inference system is used to map the functional 
relationship between hurricane parameters and the increment multipliers of the failure 
rates (IMFR) of transmission lines, i.e. the ratios of the failure rates during hurricanes 
and those in normal weather. Similarly, the IMFR of transmission lines in a given region 
is assumed to be identical. Since a long transmission line may traverse different regions, 
its overall IMFR can be determined by using weighted average method which is 
described in detail in Section 4.5. For the purpose of comparison, in this step different 
methods are used to build different types of fuzzy inference systems. 
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4.2.3 System reliability evaluation 
After the incremental failure rates of system components are obtained, short-term 
reliability indices can be computed by using analytical or simulation method. Here, 
short-term minimal cut-set method is proposed to compute system and nodal indices. 
Since the states of components are assumed to be independent here, firstly the reliability 
indices of components are computed by using the transient results of Markov process, 
then system and nodal indices are calculated by using the multiplication rule of 
probabilities. 
4.2.4 Data collection and preprocessing 
In this dissertation, data-driven method is also used to build the fuzzy inference 
system. Thus, the required data need to be collected and preprocessed. These data 
include hurricane parameters and the failure rates of system components affected. 
Usually, hurricane parameters can be collected by referring to historical meteorology 
records, and the average failure rates of system components can be obtained by referring 
to historical records of utilities, i.e. the failure rates in normal weather and during 
hurricanes are not distinguished. The failure rates of system components in different 
weathers can be obtained by using the transformation techniques like those in [43]-[44]. 
Basically, the relationship between failure frequency ( f ) and failure rate ( λ ) is used: 
λ≈f . Here, f  is the number of the failures of a system component during a period of 
time and it can be obtained from historical records. 
Since in this dissertation the output of the fuzzy inference system is the regional 
IMFR of system components, the obtained failure rates need to be preprocessed. Here, 
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the aggregated failure rates of system components during hurricanes and those in normal 
weather are compared to get the regional IMFR of system components.  
Due to the unavailability of relevant data for confidentiality reasons, the data 
used in this dissertation is generated by using the fuzzy expert system in [12]. The 
details are given in Section 4.6. 
4.3 Introduction of Fuzzy Inference Systems 
4.3.1 Basic concepts of fuzzy sets 
4.3.1.1 Crisp sets and fuzzy sets 
The concept of fuzzy sets is the generalization of that of crisp sets, i.e. classic 
sets. Usually, whether an element x is a member of a crisp set A or not is classified by 
using the characteristic function as follows: 
( )



∉
∈
=
Ax
Ax
xCF A
,0
,1
, i.e. { }1,0: →XCF A                 (27) 
where,  
CF =  characteristic function 
X =  universe of discourse of x, i.e. all the possible values that x can  
  take: discrete or continuous 
However, for a fuzzy set B the degree of whether or not an element x is its member can be 
between 0 and 1, and this is described by using the membership function as follows: 
                           [ ]1,0: →XMF B                       (28) 
Apparently, the expression of membership functions is more flexible than that of 
characteristic functions, and this makes membership functions more descriptive of how 
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the real world is perceived. Actually, we always encounter many objects that partially 
belong to a category and maybe belong to other categories at the same time. In practice, 
a membership function can be any function that satisfies the relationship defined in (28). 
It can be in triangular, trapezoidal, Gaussian, and many other forms.  
4.3.1.2 Operations on fuzzy sets 
Correspondingly, the operations of fuzzy sets are the generalization of those on 
crisp sets. For instance, the characteristic function of the intersection of two crisp sets A 
and B can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )CFCFxCF BABA ,min=I          for Xx ∈              (29) 
where, 
 min = minimum operation 
Using membership functions instead of the characteristic functions, the membership 
function of the intersection of two fuzzy sets C and D can be expressed as follows: 
 ( ) ( )MFMFxMF DCDC ,min=I         for Xx ∈             (30) 
Similarly, other operations on crisp sets can be extended to those on fuzzy sets. Here, it 
is noted that the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle are applicable to crisp 
sets but not to fuzzy sets. This is described in Table 12 where usually the universe of 
discourse of interest is the set of real numbers. More generally, the intersection operation 
on fuzzy sets can be realized by using triangular norms (t-norms) [45]. It presents a 
group of operations, e.g. minimum and product operations. In the same way, the union 
operation on fuzzy sets can be realized by using t-conorms (s-norms), e.g. maximum and 
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probabilistic sum operations. 
 
 
Table 12: Comparison of Crisp Sets and Fuzzy Sets 
Operation Crisp Sets Fuzzy Sets 
Noncontradiction ∅=AAI  ∅≠AAI  
Excluded Middle XAA =U  XAA ≠U  
 
 
4.3.1.3 Fuzzy relations 
A relation captures the association between objects. Generally, a relation R 
defined over the Cartesian product of X and Y is a collection of selected pairs ( )yx, , 
Xx ∈ , Yy ∈ . Here, the two-dimensional case is illustrated and the definition is also 
applicable to multi-dimensional case. Mathematically, R is a mapping as follows:  
( )



=
unrelatedyx
relatedyx
yxR
,,0
,,1
, , i.e. { }1,0: →×YXR        (31) 
A fuzzy relation generalizes the above concept by recognizing the partial degree of 
association between objects, i.e. a fuzzy relation RF  is a mapping such that:  
          [ ]1,0: →×YXRF                                    (32) 
Actually, a fuzzy relation is a multi-dimensional fuzzy set or a fuzzy rule, and the 
aggregation of them forms a key part of a fuzzy inference system. 
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4.3.1.4 Cylindrical extension and projection 
Cylindrical extension and projection are two important notions in fuzzy theory. 
Generally, they can be regarded as two operations on fuzzy sets. Cylindrical extension 
on a fuzzy set A is defined as follows: 
[ ] ( ) [ ]1,0:1,0: →×⇒→ YXMFXMF ACeA        (33) 
where, 
( )ACe   =  cylindrical extension on fuzzy set A 
Basically, cylindrical extension is an operation which extends a low-dimensional fuzzy 
set to a high-dimensional one. Oppositely, projection is an operation that reduces a high-
dimensional fuzzy set to a low-dimensional one. For instance, the projection of a fuzzy 
set B from space YX ×   to space X is as follows: 
[ ] ( ) [ ]1,0:1,0: Pr →⇒→× XMFYXMF BB ojY    (34) 
here, 
( )AojYPr  =  projection of fuzzy set B on Y  
4.3.1.5 Fuzzy inference  
 The inference refers to the derivation of the fuzzy set B that if a fuzzy set A and a 
fuzzy relation R between them are known. Mathematically, it is as follows: 
( )( )RACeojMF YB IPr=       (35) 
Alternately, equality (35) can be expressed as follows: 
RMFMF AB o=        (36) 
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where, 
 “o ”   = composition operation.  
The above equation is the composition rule of fuzzy inference. 
4.3.2 Fuzzy inference systems 
In this subsection, the basic concepts of fuzzy inference systems are introduced. 
Firstly, the reasoning mechanism is explained; then, the inference procedure of fuzzy 
inference systems is described.  
4.3.2.1 Reasoning mechanism  
 
 
 
Fig. 10: Reasoning of Fuzzy Inference Systems 
 
 
Actually, a fuzzy inference system is a rule-based system. Here, a fuzzy rule is 
actually a fuzzy relation. Thus, the reasoning process of a fuzzy inference system is just 
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the extension of that in the last subsection, and it is as follows: 
( )( )RACeojMF iYB ⊕= IPr            Ii ∈      (37) 
here,  
“ ⊕ ”  =  aggregation operation 
Ri   =  ith fuzzy rule 
I  =  index of the set of fuzzy rules 
The inference process of fuzzy inference systems is shown in Fig. 10. Here, f represents 
the functional relationship described by a set of fuzzy rules. 
4.3.2.2 Fuzzy inference systems  
 
 
 
Fig. 11: Architecture of Fuzzy Inference Systems 
 
 
Usually, a fuzzy inference system consists of five parts as shown in Fig. 11 [45]: 
input interface, rule base, data base, fuzzy inference, and output interface. Here, X and Y 
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represent the input and output of fuzzy inference systems respectively. Generally, there 
are two types of fuzzy inference systems: Sugeno-type [46] and Mamdani-type [47]. 
Their differences are described as follows. 
A. Input interface 
In this dissertation, the input X is the time-specific regional hurricane parameters 
and it is a vector. Thus, it needs to be converted into the form that the fuzzy inference 
system can deal with by fuzzification, i.e. finding the corresponding membership value 
of the input. This is shown in Fig. 12. Here, MF represents membership function. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12: Fuzzification 
 
 
B. Rule base 
Rule base is a set of fuzzy rules that describe the relationships between the input 
and output variables of fuzzy inference systems. Generally, for a Mamdani-type fuzzy 
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inference system a fuzzy rule can be in the following form: 
If X1  is A1  and X 2  is A2  and L  and X n  is An  then Y  is B   
here, 
X i  = ith  input variable, ni ≤  
Ai  = value of X i , ni ≤  
Y = output variable 
B = value of Y 
For instance, in this dissertation a Mamdani-type fuzzy rule can be as follows: 
If H1  is High and H 2  is Medium and L  and H n  is Low then IMFR is High 
where  
H i  = ith  hurricane parameter, ni ≤≤1  
For a Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system, a fuzzy rule can be in the following form: 
If X1  is A1  and X 2  is A2  and L  and X n  is An  then Y  is ( )XXXf nL,, 21   
here,  
( )XXXf nL,, 21  = linear function of X i , ni ≤  
C. Data base 
The type and parameters of the membership functions of input and output 
variables as well as other parameters of a fuzzy inference system are stored in data base. 
Generally, there are two kinds of methodologies to construct the rule base and data base 
of a fuzzy inference system: knowledge-based (expert systems) and data-driven [45]. In 
this dissertation, both methodologies are used. The relevant details are given in the next 
section. 
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D. Fuzzy inference 
Inference process is the most important part of a fuzzy inference system. This is 
the procedure that the fuzzy inference system processes input data and implement the 
function of reasoning using the information in rule base and data base. Its main steps are 
as follows: 
1) Input matching: for each rule, determine the membership value of each element of 
input vector.  
2) Input aggregation: for each rule, compute rule activation degree, i.e. the intersection 
of all the membership values of the input obtained in the last step. It is noted that 
different t-norm operations can be applied to different types of fuzzy inference 
systems. Here, product operation is used for the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system 
and minimum operation is used for the Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system. 
3) Output derivation: for each rule, a t-norm operation is used to compute the 
intersection of the rule activation degree and the output. Here, product operation is 
used for the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system and minimum operation is used for 
the Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system. 
4) Output aggregation: finally, normalized weighted method is used to compute the 
overall output of the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system and the details can be 
found in the next section; for the Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system, a s-norm 
operation can be used to compute the union of all the obtained output in the last step. 
Here, maximum operation is used. 
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E. Output interface 
In this dissertation, the output of the fuzzy inference system is the time-specific 
regional IMFR of system components. Whereas, the output of the Mamdani-type fuzzy 
inference system is a fuzzy set. Thus, it needs to be converted into a numeric value by 
defuzzification. There are many defuzzification techniques available [45]. Here, centroid 
method is used [45].  Basically, it determines the gravity center of the aggregated  
membership function of the overall output and is as follows: 
                        
( ) ( )
( ) ( )∫
∫ ⋅
=
Y
Y
ydyMF
ydyMFy
y                                   (38) 
where, 
MF = membership function 
For the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system, the normalized weighted method can be 
regarded as a method of defuzzification. 
4.3.2.3 Comparison of different fuzzy inference systems 
 From previous discussion, there are differences between the Sugeno-type and 
Mamdani-type fuzzy inference systems in terms of rule base, inference procedure, and 
difuzzification. Accordingly, different methods can be used to build them and this is 
described in the next section. 
4.4 Building Fuzzy Inference Systems  
Generally, there are two kinds of methodologies to build a fuzzy inference 
system: knowledge-based (expert system) and data-driven [45]. When sufficient data is 
available, a data-driven method can be used to build fuzzy inference system; if the data 
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is not available or is insufficient, knowledge-based method can be used. Moreover, other 
intelligent methods can be used to improve the performance of fuzzy inference systems. 
In this section, different methods used to build the fuzzy inference system are 
introduced: expert system [12], fuzzy clustering methods [13], and a hybrid method 
which combines a neural network and a fuzzy inference system [14]. 
4.4.1 Fuzzy expert systems 
A fuzzy inference system can be built by using artificial method, i.e. the domain 
expertise of experts are collected and processed to form a rule system. Actually, fuzzy 
expert systems are the generalization of deterministic expert systems, and they can 
handle the uncertainty and vagueness that traditional expert systems cannot deal with 
[45]. For the fuzzy inference system used in this dissertation, the domain knowledge of 
experts can be helpful to determine fuzzy rules and the parameters of membership 
functions.  
4.4.2 Fuzzy clustering methods 
A fuzzy inference systems can be built by using some data-driven methods too, 
e.g. clustering methods. In this chapter, two fuzzy clustering methods are used to build 
two types of fuzzy inference systems [13]: subtractive clustering [48] is used to build the 
Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system and fuzzy c-mean clustering [49] is used to build 
the Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system. In the end, different fuzzy clustering methods 
are compared.  
4.4.2.1 Fuzzy clustering methods 
Usually, some relationships exist among a set of variables and the corresponding 
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data can be collected via observation. Fuzzy clustering methods group these data into 
different clusters. Each fuzzy cluster is represented by a cluster center and the 
membership degrees of the data belonging to this cluster, and it represents a fuzzy rule. 
At the same time the membership functions can be obtained by projecting the fuzzy 
clusters on the spaces of input and output variables. Thus, fuzzy clustering methods can 
construct the membership functions and fuzzy rules of a fuzzy inference system 
automatically and simultaneously, and the number of fuzzy rules obtained can be 
reduced compared to that of a fuzzy expert system [45]. 
4.4.2.2 Subtractive clustering  
The basic idea of subtractive clustering is as follows [48]:  
1) The potential value of each data point as a cluster center is computed based on its 
distances to other data points. 
2) The data point with the highest potential value is chosen as the first cluster center, 
and the potentials of all data points (including the cluster center) are reduced 
according to their distances to this cluster center. 
3) For other data points, the one with the highest remaining potential value is chosen as 
the next cluster center. 
4) The above procedure goes on till the potential values of all data points fall below 
some threshold.  
Mathematically, the main steps of subtractive clustering are as follows: 
1) For a collection of data points { }xxx n,,, 21 L , the following equation is used to 
compute the potential value of each data point as a cluster center: 
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                              (39)  
where, 
  Pi  = potential value of data point xi  
n = number of data points 
  α  =  
rα
2
4
, and rα  is a positive constant 
  
⋅
 = Euclidean distance   
The above measure shows that a data point with many neighboring data points 
nearby will have a high potential value. The neighborhood radius is defined by rα  
and the data points outside rα  have little influences on the potential of the data 
point. Generally, a large rα  results in fewer clusters and a small rα  results in more 
clusters.  
2) Suppose now the kth cluster center has been determined, then the potential values of 
all data points (including the cluster centers) are in the following form: 
                    
( ) ( )
ePPP xkxikii
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−−
∗−
⋅−=
2
1 β
                (40)             
 
where, 
  
( )Pi k  = potential of data point xi , and ( ) PP ii =0  
xk
∗
 = kth cluster center 
  Pk
∗
 = potential value of xk
∗
 
 67
  β  = 
r β 2
4
, and rβ  is a positive constant 
 The above equation shows that the data point near the cluster center has greatly 
reduced potential and therefore is unlikely to be chosen as the next cluster center. 
The radius of reduction neighborhood is defined by rβ  and it is selected as being 
greater than rα  in order not to produce two close adjacent cluster centers. 
3) The following equation is used to compute the membership degree of each data point 
belonging to the fuzzy cluster with cluster center x k ∗ : 
                           em xkxii
∗
−−
=
2
α
                                (41)  
 
where, 
   mi  = membership degree of xi .  
Actually, the membership function is in the form of Gaussian function. 
4) Since subtractive clustering is used to build the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system, 
its output functions are determined by using linear regression [48].  
4.4.2.3 Fuzzy c-mean clustering 
Fuzzy c-mean clustering is one of the most used fuzzy clustering methods in 
pattern recognition [49]. Its basic idea is to assign each data point to several pre-
determined cluster centers and a constrained objective function is solved to determine 
the optimal partition.  
Mathematically, the objective function is as follows: 
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where, 
c =  number of cluster centers 
  n =  number of data points 
 xk  = kth data point, nk ≤≤1  
 vi  = ith cluster center, ci ≤≤1  
  uik  = membership value of xk  belonging to the ith fuzzy cluster 
m = a constant representing fuzzification degree, and 1≥m  
Normally, small or big value of m leads to small or big number of cluster centers. The 
above formulation is a non-linear constrained optimization problem and its optimality 
condition is as follows: 
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where, 
vi
∗
 = ith optimal cluster center  
u ik
∗
 = optimal membership value of data point xk  belonging to the ith  
  fuzzy cluster  
Equations (46)-(47) show that the update of vu iik  can only be done if the value of 
uv iki  has been known. Thus, an alternate optimization algorithm can be used to solve 
the problem (42)-(45), and it is as follows. Here, vi  is assumed being known. Similarly, 
we can assume uik  being known first.  
1) Using (47) to compute uik ;  
2) Using (46) to update vi  and suppose now it is vi ;  
3) Test if vv ii −  is not greater than a pre-set threshold: if true, stop; otherwise, go 
back to step (1).  
4.4.2.4 Comparison of two methods 
From previous discussion, subtractive clustering and fuzzy c-mean clustering are 
compared as follows: 
A. Initialization problem 
For subtractive clustering, the initialization is simple and it considers each data 
point as a potential cluster center; for fuzzy c-mean clustering, this problem is more 
complex. There are several methods to get the initial cluster centers, e.g. randomly 
choosing some points, choosing cluster centers according to some modeling or choosing 
the results of another clustering method as cluster centers, and the chosen cluster centers 
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can be data points or not. Here, the results of subtractive clustering are chosen as the 
initial cluster centers of fuzzy c-mean clustering. 
B. Implementation procedure 
The comparison of their algorithms shows that the implementation of subtractive 
clustering is simpler than that of fuzzy c-mean clustering. Since fuzzy c-mean clustering 
solves a constrained optimization problem, it has the inherent weaknesses in 
initialization and convergence, i.e. the sensitivity to initialization and the possibility of 
trapping at a saddle point, i.e. a local minimum. 
C. Complementation of two methods 
By contrast, subtractive clustering is a simpler method. But, these two methods 
can be complementary rather than competitive. For example, as mentioned earlier the 
results of subtractive clustering can be used as the initial cluster centers of fuzzy c-mean 
clustering. Thus, the performance of fuzzy c-mean clustering can be improved.  
4.4.2.5 Mamdani-type membership functions 
The input membership functions of Sugeno-type fuzzy inference systems are in 
the form of Gaussian function, whereas the membership functions of Mamdani-type 
fuzzy inference systems are not in any specific form. Here, the membership functions of 
the Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system are obtained by using the projection method 
and are approximated by using two-side Gaussian function [50]. It is actually a 
combination of two Gaussian functions, and each one represents a side of the 
membership function.  
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4.4.3 A hybrid method 
   After a fuzzy inference system is built, its parameters can be fine tuned by using 
some intelligent methods. In this chapter, a neural network is used to improve the 
performance of the Segeno-type fuzzy inference system. Here, adaptive neuro-fuzzy 
inference system (ANFIS) is used [51]. In this subsection, firstly the underlying 
motivation of combing fuzzy inference systems and neural networks is given. Then, the 
algorithm of ANFIS is introduced. 
4.4.3.1 Neuro-fuzzy systems 
 
 
Table 13: Comparison of Neural Networks and Fuzzy Inference Systems 
 Neural Networks Fuzzy Inference Systems 
Advantages 
No mathematical model No mathematical model 
No rules required Prior knowledge used 
Learning ability Inference and interpretability 
Disadvantages 
Black box Rules required 
No prior knowledge No learning 
Iteration needed 
to determine parameters 
Difficulty in tuning 
parameters 
 
 
Neural networks and fuzzy inference systems have some common merits, e.g. no 
need for establishing mathematical model in advance and universal approximation 
feature. However, they have their own advantages. As compared in Table 13 [52], neural 
networks have a learning ability but it is difficult to incorporate prior knowledge into 
them and to interpret their processing procedure; fuzzy systems can utilize prior 
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knowledge and it is easy to interpret their inference process, but they have no learning 
ability. Therefore, it is appealing to combine the merits of neural networks and fuzzy 
inference systems and the resultant is neuro-fuzzy systems. Here, the emphasis is to use 
the learning ability of neural networks to improve the performance of fuzzy inference 
systems. 
4.4.3.2 Algorithm of ANFIS  
 
 
 
Fig. 13: Configuration of Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System 
 
 
            Adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system is a popular neuro-fuzzy system. It has the 
configuration of a multilayer perceptron, i.e. a feed-forward neural network that consists 
of an input layer, one or multiple hidden layers and an output layer. Actually, adaptive 
neuro-fuzzy inference system uses a multilayer perceptron to realize the functions of a 
Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system. In such a way, it combines the merits of neural 
networks and fuzzy inference systems. It has the learning feature of neural networks and 
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retains the interpretability of fuzzy inference systems. Therefore, adaptive neuro-fuzzy 
inference system can use the learning ability of neural networks to improve the 
performance of Sugeno-type fuzzy inference systems. The schematic architecture of 
adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system is shown in Fig. 13 [51]. Here, only two input 
variables and one output variable are shown. And, 
Li  = layer i, i =1, 2, 3, 4, 5  
The operating procedure of adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system is as follows: 
• Layer 1 
X i  = ith input variable, i=1, 2 
Ai , Bi  = Gaussian-shaped linguistic labels, i=1, 2, and their parameters are  
   called antecedent parameters. 
output = membership value  
• Layer 2 
“×” = product operation 
W i  = product of the membership values of X i , i=1, 2, i.e. rule  
   activation degree  
• Layer 3 
“N” = normalization operation 
W i  =  
∑
=
2
1i
i
i
W
W
, i=1, 2 
• Layer 4 
f i   = ith linear output function, i=1, 2, and its parameters are called  
   consequent parameters  
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“ f i⋅ ”  = “multiplied by f i ”  
yi   = fW ii ⋅ , i = 1, 2  
• Layer 5 
“+” = summation operation 
y  = 
∑
∑ ⋅
=∑ ⋅=∑
=
=
==
2
1
2
12
1
2
1
i
i
i
ii
i
ii
i
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As mentioned before, adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system has a learning 
ability, i.e. it can adjust its parameters to achieve the minimal error measure using the 
samples of input and output data. Adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system realizes its 
learning ability using a hybrid algorithm: backpropagation and least squares estimation. 
Generally, the learning process of adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system is as follows:  
1) The input is forwarded and consequent parameters are estimated by using least 
squares estimation while antecedent parameters are assumed unchanged.  
2) The error signal in the last step is propagated backwards and antecedent parameters 
are updated by using backpropagation while estimated consequent parameters are 
used and they are assumed unchanged.  
3) The learning process stops if the error measure is below some threshold. 
4.4.4 Clustering Data 
In the previous subsections, the implementation of the data-driven methods 
depends on the availability of relevant data. Due to the unavailability of the data for  
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confidentiality reasons, the clustering data used in this dissertation is generated by using 
the fuzzy expert system in [12] and the details are given in Section 4.6. 
4.5 Short-Term Minimal Cut-Set Method 
In this section, the short-term minimal cut-set method proposed to compute time-
specific reliability indices is presented. Firstly, the short-term reliability indices used are 
introduced; then, the computation procedure of reliability indices is described and 
finally, the weighted average method used to compute the overall IMFR of transmission 
lines that traverse a few regions is presented. 
4.5.1 Short-term reliability indices  
Since hurricanes usually last only a few days, the short-term reliability indices of 
composite power systems should be calculated instead of the long-term ones. In the last 
chapter, equations (3), (6)-(7) are suitable for calculating steady state reliability indices 
but not the short-term ones.  
In this section, the short-term reliability indices used are interval frequency and 
fractional duration [53], and they are defined as follows: 
          ( )∫= t
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),( −∫=                         (49) 
where,  
IF  =  interval frequency  
FD  = fractional duration  
[ ]tt 21,   = time duration of interest 
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( )tf f    = time-specific value of failure frequency 
( )tp f    = time-specific value of failure probability 
Actually, interval frequency is the expected number of system failures, and fractional 
duration is the mean value of ( )tp f  during [ ]tt 21, . In definition (48), the upper and 
lower bounds on ( )tf f  can be computed by using the following equations which are 
derived based on [54]:    
( ) ( ) ( )( )∑ ∑⋅= ∈i j jf
j
s
jit
u
f
Ci tp
tp
Cptf λ                          (50) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )∑ ∑⋅−∑ ∑⋅= < ∈∈ ji j jf
j
sjjit
i j jf
j
sjit
l
f
CCC jii tp
tp
CCp
tp
tp
Cptf
U
I λλ
  
      (51) 
where, 
 )(tf uf
  
= first upper bound on )(tf f
 
)(tf lf   = first lower bound on )(tf f  
( )Cp it   = time-specific value of the occurrence probability of  
   minimal cut-set Ci  
λ j    = constant failure rate of component j 
)(tp js   = success probability of component j by time t 
)(tp jf   = failure probability of component j by time t 
In this dissertation, the time-specific value ( )tjλ  of λ j  is assumed to be constant during 
a small time interval t∆ . Thus, equations (50)-(51) can be used appropriately. Actually, 
when extended to steady state equations (50)-(51) are the same as (6)-(7) in Chapter III.  
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 In definition (49), ( )tp f  can be computed by using (4)-(5) in Chapter III. Since  
the states of components are assumed to be independent with each other in this chapter, 
the multiplication rule of probabilities can be used to compute the time-specific failure 
probability of a minimal cut-set or that of a union of minimal cut-sets. Additionally, we 
have ( ) ( )tptp jfjs −= 1 , thus the calculation of the short-term reliability indices only 
depends on that of the time-specific failure probabilities of components as described in 
the next subsection.                                                              
4.5.2 Time-specific probabilities of components 
For time-specific case, the steady state results of Markov process are not suitable 
to compute the reliability indices. Instead, the transient state results of Markov process 
should be used. Basically, a set of differential equations need to be solved. In this 
chapter, for the investigation of the temporal effect of a hurricane, its duration is 
portioned into some small time intervals. Thus, the continuous time Markov chain to 
model the time-specific characteristics of a system component affected by hurricanes can 
be approximated by using a pseudo discrete time Markov chain. Thus, only a set of 
linear equations need to be solved as described as follows. Suppose that the hurricane 
duration [ ]tt 21,  is partitioned into n equal time intervals and each one is ∆t, i.e. 
( ) nttt 12 −=∆ . For component j in the ith time interval, the following equation can be 
derived from [23]: 
   
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]tiRIipipipip jjfjsjfjs ∆⋅+⋅−−= 11          (52)                                 
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where, 
  ( )ip js   = success probability of component j by the end of the ith  
    time interval  
( )ip jf
  
= failure probability of component j by the end of the ith  
    time interval  
I  = identity matrix  
( )iR j    = transition rate matrix of component j in the ith time  
   interval and is assumed to be a constant matrix  
Basically, equation (52) approximates a continuous time non-Markov process by using a 
pseudo discrete time Markov process with an equal time step t∆  and different constant 
transition rate matrix in each step. If the repair of a failed component is not considered, 
i.e. 0=µ j , the following equations are obtained: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )tiipip jjsjs ∆⋅−⋅−= λ11                         (54) 
               ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 −+∆⋅−= iptiipip jfjjsjf λ                      (55) 
where, 
µ j
  
=  rapier rate of component j 
  ( )ijλ   =  failure rate of component j in the ith time interval 
and is assumed to be a constant  
There is an interpretation of equations (54)-(55): if suppose that at the beginning of the 
ith time interval the success probability of component j is 1, it is well known that by the 
end of the ith time interval its failure probability is ( ) ( ) tie jtij ∆≈− ∆− λλ1  if ( ) tij ∆λ  is 
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small enough. Equations (54)-(55) can be interpreted as a modification of the preceding 
conclusion when the initial success probability of component j is ( )1−ip js . From 
equation (55), the time-specific failure probability of component j can be calculated by 
using the following iteration:  
            ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )111 −+∆⋅−−= iptiipip jfjjfjf λ                   (56) 
                           ( ) 00 =p jf                                        (57)  
Here, condition (57) refers to the assumption that at the beginning of the first time 
interval the failure probability of component j is 0. 
4.5.3 Time-specific system and nodal indices 
After the time-specific reliability indices of components are calculated (actually 
only those of the components belonging to some minimal cut-sets need to be computed),  
time-specific system and nodal reliability indices can be calculated as follows. The only 
difference in computing system and nodal indices is that system and nodal minimal cut-
sets should be used appropriately. 
1) It is pointed out that the desired reliability indices are ( )ip f , ( )ttIF 21,  and 
( )ttFD 21, . Here, 
( )ip f  = failure probability by the end of the ith time interval 
2) Use equations (4)-(5) to compute the bounds on ( )ip f
 
and their average is used as 
its value. 
3) In [53] it is pointed out that the following equation can be obtained if the repair is not 
considered: 
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( ) ( )ttpttIF f 2121 ,, =
                     
   (58) 
here, 
( )ttp f 21,   = failure probability by time t2  assuming that the time starts  
    at t1  
Thus, there is no extra computation for ( )ttIF 21, , and its value can be obtained from 
the last step directly. Since no repair of failed components is considered, failure 
probability p f  is monotonically increasing during [ ]tt 21, . Thus, ( )ttIF 21,  is actually 
the maximal value of p f  by time t2 . 
4) From equation (49), the following equation can be used to compute ( )ttFD 21, .      
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              (59) 
Thus, ( )ttFD 21,  is just the mean value of the results of Step (2).  
5) It is possible that utilities may arrange more repair teams and materials than they 
normally do to be prepared for upcoming hurricanes. When the repair of failed 
components is considered, an approach is to assume that the repair rate of a single 
component is a smaller number than that of it in normal weather, and it is a constant 
during the duration of hurricanes [13].  
4.5.4 Weighted average method 
To investigate the spatial effect of hurricanes on composite power systems, the 
power system is divided into different regions. If a transmission line traverses a few 
regions, its overall IMFR can be calculated as follows: 
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where, 
  ni  = overall IMFR of transmission line i  
M = index of the set of all the regions that transmission line i traverses  
l ji  = length of transmission line i in region j 
li  = overall length of transmission line i 
n
j
i  = IMFR of transmission lines i in region j 
w
j
i  = weight of transmission line i belonging to region j 
4.6 Implementation 
In this section, the proposed methodology investigating the impact of hurricanes 
on the short-term reliability of composite power systems is applied to the modified IEEE 
reliability test system. Firstly, the data used in this chapter is presented; then, the 
different types of fuzzy inference systems built by using different methods are presented; 
finally, evaluation results obtained by using different methods are compared and 
analyzed.  
4.6.1 Test system 
Here, the test system used is the same as that in the last chapter, and is not 
described in this chapter repeatedly. 
4.6.2 Relevant data 
4.6.2.1 Clustering data 
Here, the training data for the data-driven methods is generated by using the 
fuzzy expert system in [12]. To verify the effectiveness of different data-driven methods, 
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the criterion is as follows: if the results obtained are close to those in [12], the data-
driven method is effective - the closer to the results in [12], more effective it is. In detail, 
the data is obtained as follows: for each input variable, the input data is generated from 
its minimal value to its maximal value with a step being ( ) 100minmax− , here max and 
min represent the minimal and maximal values respectively, and the inferred output is 
used as the output data. Thus, 101 data points are obtained for the data-driven methods. 
Using these data, different types of fuzzy inference systems are built by using MATLAB 
[50].   
4.6.2.2 Hurricane data 
 
 
Table 14: Hurricane Data 
Time 
Interval 
Region 1 Region 2 
Wind Speed 
(mph) 
Rainfall 
(in) 
Wind Speed 
(mph) 
Rainfall 
(in) 
1 80 10 70 5 
2 90 15 80 10 
3 100 20 90 15 
4 110 25 100 20 
5 120 30 110 25 
6 130 35 120 30 
7 140 40 130 35 
8 130 35 120 30 
9 120 30 110 25 
10 110 25 100 20 
11 100 20 90 15 
12 90 15 80 10 
 
 
Here, the IEEE reliability test system is partitioned into two parts and the split 
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basically follows along its voltage levels. Specifically, the tie lines between the 230KV 
and 138KV parts of the IEEE reliability test system are four transmission lines [38]. The 
split is assumed to pass through the middle points of these lines. The hurricane 
parameters are listed in Table 14. Here, hurricane duration is assumed to be 48 hours, 
and each time interval is set as 4 hours. 
 
 
Table 15: Rule Base (S-FIS) 
Output Rainfall High Medium Low 
Wind Speed 
High Output(H)   
Medium  Output(M)  
Low   Output(L) 
 
 
4.6.3. Different fuzzy inference systems  
4.6.3.1 Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system 
For the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system, the fuzzy rules are listed in Table 
15. Here, Output (H/M/L) represents the output function. The membership functions of 
the input variables are shown in Figs. 14-15. It is noted that the output in Table 15 and 
those in Tables 16-17 are different: in Table 15 the output represents the linear function 
of the input variables; in Tables 16-17 the output represents membership function.  
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Fig. 14: Membership Function of Wind Speed (S-FIS) 
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Fig. 15: Membership Function of Rainfall (S-FIS) 
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4.6.3.2 Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system  
For the Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system, the fuzzy rules are listed in Table 
16, and the membership functions of the input and output variables are shown in Figs. 
16-18. 
 
 
Table 16: Rule Base (M-FIS) 
Output Rainfall High Medium Low 
Wind Speed 
High High   
Medium  Medium  
Low   Low 
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Fig. 16: Membership Function of Wind Speed (M-FIS) 
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Fig. 17: Membership Function of Rainfall (M-FIS) 
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Fig. 18: Membership Function of IMFR (M-FIS) 
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4.6.3.3 Fuzzy expert system 
For comparison, the fuzzy rules of the fuzzy expert system in [12] are listed in 
Table 17, and its membership functions are shown in Figs. 19-21. 
 
 
Table 17: Rule Base (FES) 
Output Rainfall High Medium Low 
Wind Speed High High High Medium Low Medium Low Low 
 
 
 
70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
windspeed(mph)
De
gr
ee
 
of
 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p
low high
 
Fig. 19: Membership Function of Wind Speed (FES) 
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Fig. 20: Membership Function of Rainfall (FES) 
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Fig. 21: Membership Function of IMFR (FES) 
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4.6.4 Evaluation results 
The system reliability indices obtained by using different methods are listed in 
Table 18 and are shown in Fig. 22. Here, for simplicity no repair of failed components is 
considered. The legends used in Fig. 22 are as follows: 
FPSF: system failure probability of Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system 
FPMF: system failure probability of Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system 
FPF: system failure probability of fuzzy expert system 
FDSF: fractional duration of Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system 
FDMF: fractional duration of Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system 
FDF: fractional duration of fuzzy expert system 
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Fig. 22: Short-Term System Failure Probability (Independent Failures) 
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Table 18: Short-Term System Failure Probability (Independent Failures) 
Time 
Interval 
System Failure Probability 
Sugeno-Type 
System 
Mamdani-Type 
System 
Fuzzy Expert 
System 
1 0.0018 0.0036 0.0017 
2 0.0041 0.0076 0.0034 
3 0.0084 0.0133 0.0049 
4 0.0164 0.0197 0.0104 
5 0.0267 0.0262 0.0201 
6 0.0363 0.0327 0.0296 
7 0.0455 0.0411 0.0391 
8 0.0549 0.0476 0.0484 
9 0.0648 0.0538 0.0577 
10 0.0723 0.06 0.063 
11 0.0764 0.0654 0.0644 
12 0.0785 0.0692 0.066 
Interval 
Frequency 
(Maximum) 
0.0785 0.0692 0.066 
Fractional 
Duration 
(Mean) 
0.0405 0.0367 0.0341 
 
 
The nodal reliability indices obtained by using different methods are listed in 
Table 19. Here, for simplicity only those of two methods are listed. 
4.6.5 Comparison of results from different methods 
According to the obtained results, the following conclusions can be made: 
1. Figs. 14-21 show that the membership functions obtained by using different methods 
can be much different. 
2. Tables 15-17 show that fuzzy clustering methods can effectively reduce the number 
of the fuzzy rules of the fuzzy inference system, i.e. it can alleviate the 
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dimensionality problem of the artificial method.  
 
 
Table 19: Short-Term Nodal Failure Probability (Independent Failures) 
Node 
Fractional Duration 
Mamdani-Type 
System 
Fuzzy Expert 
System 
1 0.0122 0.0114 
2 0.0121 0.0114 
3 0.0116 0.0109 
4 0.0121 0.0114 
5 0.0122 0.0115 
6 0.0334 0.0308 
7 0.0091 0.0084 
8 0.0032 0.0032 
9 0.0094 0.0088 
10 0.0121 0.0114 
13 0.0119 0.0112 
14 0.0018 0.0018 
15 0.0107 0.01 
16 0.0114 0.0107 
18 0.0021 0.0022 
19 0.0115 0.0108 
20 0.0032 0.0032 
System Indices 
(Mean) 0.0367 0.0341 
 
 
3. Table 18 and Fig. 22 show that the evaluation results obtained by using different 
methods are different. Compared with the results of the fuzzy expert system, the 
Mamdani-type fuzzy inference system appears to obtain more accurate results than 
the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system since the results of the former are closer to 
those of the fuzzy expert system. The reasons are as follows: 
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1) The membership functions of the input of the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system 
is in the form of Gaussian function. Actually, this approximation may be over-
simplification. 
2) The assumption of the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system that the input and the 
output variables have a linear functional relationship may be also over-
simplification.  
4. Table 18 and Fig. 22 also show that for time-specific case, interval index fractional 
duration can more clearly indicate the performance of different methods than time-
specific failure probability. 
5. Table 19 shows that nodal reliability indices can be much different. They can be 
helpful for utilities to effectively allocate recourses in preparation for upcoming 
hurricanes.  
6. The proposed methodology is efficient. After the fuzzy inference system is built, its 
inference time is almost negligible. 
7. In this chapter, the proposed methodology evaluates the impact of hurricanes on the 
short-term reliability of composite power systems. It is also applicable to simulation 
method as well as in other systems, e.g. distribution systems.  
8. In this chapter, for simplicity the repair of failed components is not considered. But, 
the proposed methodology is also applicable when the repair is considered. 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite 
power systems is investigated. The incremental failure rates of system components are 
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obtained by combining a fuzzy inference system and regional weather model. For the 
purpose of comparison, different methods are used to build different types of fuzzy 
inference systems. Since hurricanes only last a short period of time but their effects are 
drastic, time-specific system and nodal reliability indices are calculated during the 
duration of hurricanes.  
The proposed methodology is applied to the modified IEEE reliability test 
system. From the implementation, the main conclusions obtained in this chapter are 
summarized as follows: 
1) The proposed methodology is effective. It can evaluate the impact of hurricanes on 
the failure rate increment of system components temporally and spatially. 
2) The proposed methodology is efficient. After the fuzzy inference system is built, its 
inference time is almost negligible. 
3) The performances of different methods are different. But, different methods can be 
complementary rather than competitive. In practice, the requirements of efficiency 
and accuracy can determine the selection of suitable method. 
4) For time-specific case, steady state reliability indices are not suitable anymore. 
Instead, short-term indices should be used such as interval frequency and fractional 
duration. 
5) Nodal reliability indices can provide helpful information for utilities to effectively 
allocate recourses in preparation for upcoming hurricanes.  
6) The proposed methodology is flexible in its applications. It is applicable to analytical 
and simulation methods, and can be applied to different systems.  
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7) It should be pointed out that the implementation of the proposed methodology is 
mainly to demonstrate the feasibility of the idea. For practical applications, relevant 
hurricane parameters and the failure data of system components can be used to build 
the fuzzy inference system. 
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                                                         CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION OF HURRICANE IMPACT ON THE SHORT-TERM RELIABILITY 
OF COMPOSITE POWER SYSTEMS INCLUDING COMMON-CAUSE FAILURES 
 
In the previous chapter, the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of 
composite power systems is investigated and the states of components are assumed to be 
independent. Another impact of hurricanes on composite power systems is that they can 
cause simultaneous failures of multiple components. For instance, hurricanes can 
damage transmission towers and the transmission lines on them can collapse together. 
This kind of failures is called common-cause failures and it can deteriorate the reliability 
of composite power systems affected by hurricanes. Thus, the common-cause failures of 
components should be included in the investigation of hurricane impact on the short-
term reliability of composite power systems. 
In this chapter, the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite 
power systems is investigated and both the independent and common-cause failures of 
components are considered. Here, two methods are proposed to achieve this goal. One of 
them uses a Bayesian network to alleviate the dimensionality problem of conditional 
probability method. Another one extends minimal cut-set method to model the common-
cause failures of system components. 
The proposed methods are applied to the modified IEEE reliability test system. 
The evaluation results obtained by using the two methods are compared and analyzed. 
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The implementation demonstrates that the proposed methods are effective and are 
flexible in their applications. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section  5.1 relevant researches that 
investigated the effect of common-cause failures are reviewed; in Section 5.2 the overall 
scheme for investigating the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of 
composite power systems is presented; in Section 5.3 the basic concepts of Bayesian 
networks are introduced; in Section 5.4 the use of noisy OR-gate model is presented; in 
Section 5.5 the use of pseudo repetitive temporal model to compute time-specific system 
reliability indices is described; in Section 5.6 the extended minimal cut-set method is 
presented; in Section 5.7 the proposed methods are applied to the modified IEEE 
reliability test system; finally, the summary concludes this chapter. 
5.1 Literature Review 
Common-cause failures refer to the simultaneous failures of multiple components 
due to a common cause. With the effect of common-cause failures considered, the states 
of component become dependent, and reliability evaluation becomes more complex.  
Some methods for evaluating the effects of common-cause failures are listed in 
[10]. These methods include beta-factor model, basic-parameter model, multiple Greek 
letter model, binomial failure-rate model, and Markov model. But, these models are not 
suitable for composite power systems. These models have two disadvantages when they 
are applied to composite power systems. One is that their required parameters drastically 
increase as the number of system components increases [55]. The other is that these 
models usually rely on some special techniques, e.g. building fault trees or solving 
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equations, thus they are computationally tedious when the number of system 
components is large [56]-[57]. In [56]-[57] some improved methods such as binary 
decision diagram and dynamic fault tree have been proposed. 
A straightforward method for evaluating the effect of common-cause failures is 
conditional probability formula [19], [23], [58]. Actually, this method decomposes 
system state space on condition whether common-cause failures occur or not. Thus, for 
each decomposed state space, the failures of system components are independent, and 
the evaluation of common-cause failures can be simplified. However, this method has a 
significant drawback that the decomposition is subject to an exponential explosion when 
the number of common-cause failures considered increases, i.e. if the number of 
common-cause failures is n, the number of decompositions will be 2n . 
Hurricanes are extreme adverse weather and can cause common-cause failures in 
composite power systems. In [13], the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability 
of composite power systems was investigated. But, the common-cause failures of system 
components were not considered in [13].  
In this chapter, two methods are proposed to investigate the impact of hurricanes 
on the short-term reliability of composite power systems, and both the independent and 
common-cause failures of components are considered [15]-[16]. 
The first proposed method is based on Bayesian networks. Basically, it uses 
noisy OR-gate model to alleviate the dimensionality problem of conditional probability 
method, and uses pseudo repetitive temporal model to calculate time-specific system 
reliability indices.  
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Compared to other methods, the proposed method has following advantages: 
1) By using certain techniques [59]-[60], a complex Bayesian network can be 
simplified. 
2) The parameters of a Bayesian network can be obtained by using some learning 
algorithms, e.g. Monte Carlo simulation. 
3) Bayesian networks have a powerful inferring capability and the inference results may 
be various probabilities, such as marginal probability, joint probability, and posterior 
probability.  
4)  Bayesian networks can be applied to time-specific case by using repetitive temporal 
model [61].  
The second proposed method extends minimal cut-set method to model the 
common-cause failures of system components. The basic idea is to formulate the 
components associated with a common-cause failure as one component. 
Both proposed methods are applied to the modified IEEE reliability test system. 
The results obtained by using the two methods are compared and analyzed. The 
implementation demonstrates that the proposed methods are effective and are flexible in 
their applications. 
5.2 Overall Evaluation Scheme 
As shown in Fig. 23, the overall scheme for investigating the impact of 
hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite power systems consists of two 
parts: determining the failure rate increment of system components, and evaluating the 
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effect of common-cause failures. Here, system failure refers to any load shedding at any 
node of a composite power system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 23: Overall Short-Term Reliability Evaluation Scheme 
 
 
5.2.1 Increment of failure rates  
One of the impacts of hurricanes on composite power system reliability is that 
they can increase the failure rates of system components, and this has been investigated 
in the last chapter. In this chapter, this impact of hurricanes is also considered to obtain 
the overall reliability evaluation results. However, this chapter emphasizes on the 
assessment of the common-cause failures of system components, and the relevant results 
in the last chapter are directly used here. 
Hurricane 
System Failure 
 
Independent 
Failure  
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Cause Failure 
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5.2.2 Common-cause failures 
In this chapter, the effect of common-cause failures caused by hurricanes on the 
short-term reliability of composite power systems is assessed. Finally, the marginal 
probability of system failure, and the occurrence probabilities of common-cause failures 
conditioning on the occurrence of system failure are calculated. The latter probability 
refers to the occurrence probability of a common-cause failure when system failure has 
been observed. This probability indicates the chance of the occurrence of a common-
cause failure when system failure occurs, and can be helpful for the decision-making 
process of utilities. The detailed discussion is given in Section 5.4.  
There are a few points to be noted as follows: 
1) This chapter investigates the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of 
composite power systems considering both the independent and common-cause 
failures of components. Thus, the final evaluation results are the overall reliability 
indices.  
2) Although this chapter assesses the common-cause failures due to damaged 
transmission towers on which transmission lines are installed, the proposed methods 
are also applicable to other types of  common-cause failures in other systems, e.g. 
that caused by a bus failure.  
3) The transmission lines associated with a common-cause failure may comprise a 
minimal cut-set or not. This is an important issue in this chapter. The relevant details 
are discussed in Section 5.4. and 5.6. 
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4) For simplicity, the repair of failed transmission towers and system components are 
not considered. The reason is that usually hurricanes make such repair difficult. But, 
it is possible that utilities arrange more repair crew and equipments for upcoming 
hurricanes than they do in normal weather. When the repair is considered, [13] 
proposed an approach to deal with the independent failures of system components.  
5.3 Introduction of Bayesian Networks 
In this section, the basic concepts of Bayesian networks are introduced to 
facilitate the following discussion. Firstly, a simple example is given to illustrate the 
basic idea of Bayesian networks; then, modeling Bayesian networks and their inference 
are introduced; additionally, using Bayesian networks for time-specific applications, and 
modeling different types of random variables are introduced.  
5.3.1 A simple example  
Basically, a Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph and its structure and 
parameters determine its functionality. The structure includes nodes and directed edges: 
the former represent random variables and the latter usually represent their causal 
relationships. The parameters are the conditional probability distributions associated 
with the nodes. Numerous algorithms for the inference and learning in Bayesian 
networks have been developed.  
A simple Bayesian network is shown in Fig. 24. Here, random variable X i , 
4,3,2,1=i , represents an event. According to the chain rule of probabilities, the 
following equation is obtained: 
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Fig. 24: A Simple Bayesian Network 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )XPXXPXXXPXXXXPXXXXP 11221332144321 ,,,,,, ⋅⋅⋅=      (61) 
here,  
P =  probability  
In Fig. 24, if there is an edge from a node to another node, the node at head end is the 
parent of that at tail end or the node at tail end is the child of that at head end. For 
example, X1  is the parent of X 2  and X 3 , and they are the parents of X 4 , or X 4  is the 
child of X 2  and X 3  and they are the children of X1 . According to the recursive 
factorization of above joint probability distribution [62], the following equation is 
obtained: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )XPXXPXXPXXXPXXXXP 112133244321 ,,,, ⋅⋅⋅=        (62)                            
The above equation shows that the joint probability distribution can be expressed as the 
product of some conditional probability distributions, and each conditional probability 
distribution is in the form ( )( )XPaXP ii , 4,3,2,1=i . 
 
X1 
X2 X3 
X4 
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here, 
  
( )XPa i  = parents of random variable X i , 4,3,2,1=i  
 In contrast, (62) is more compact than (61), and the joint probability is easy to be 
computed if all the conditional probabilities in (62) are known. Then, all the other 
probabilities, say ( )XXXP 321 ,, , ( )XXXP 132 , , or ( )XXP 21 , can be computed 
accordingly by using variable elimination and conditional probability formula. For 
example, after summing out X 4  we get ( )XXXP 321 ,, . Repeatedly, we can get 
( )XXP 21,  , ( )XP 1 , and ( )XP 2 . Then, the desired conditional probabilities can be 
computed accordingly if the marginal probabilities are greater than zero.  
( ) ( )( )XP
XXXPXXXP
1
321
132
,,
, =        (63) 
( ) ( )( )XP
XXPXXP
2
21
21
,
=         (64) 
If the marginal probabilities equal to zero, seemingly the above conditional probabilities 
equal to zero too. 
A pivotal concept of Bayesian networks is the conditional independences of 
random variables. For example, (61) and (62) show that the following equations can be 
obtained: 
( ) ( )XXXPXXXXP 3243214 ,,, =          (65) 
( ) ( )XXPXXXP 13213 , =         (66) 
The conditional independences of Bayesian networks can be equally expressed as 
follows with some assumptions [63]: 
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Global Markov property 
 Basically, global Markov property refers to that two sets of nodes can be 
separated by a set of nodes which is called a d-separation [62]. Actually, the Markov 
blanket of a node is the minimal one of all the d-separations, and it consists of the 
parents and children of a node, and the parents of the children of the node.  
Local Markov property 
This property refers to that a node is independent of the nodes of its non-
descendants given its parents [63]. Here, the descendants of a node refer to all the nodes 
which are connected by the directed edges emanating from the node. 
Factorization 
 Actually, an easily understandable factorization form of Bayesian networks, 
named recursive factorization, has been illustrated in the simple example. More 
generally, a joint probability distribution can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )( )∏=
≤≤ ni
iin XBXPXXXP
1
21 ,, L                                        (67) 
here, 
( )XB i   = nodes before X i  according to some principle 
Equally, the joint probability distribution can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )( )∏=
≤≤ ni
iin XAXPXXXP
1
21 ,, L                                        (68) 
here, 
( )XA i   =  nodes after X i  according to some principle 
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 Summarily, a Bayesian network uniquely determines a joint probability 
distribution of the random variables [61]. By using recursive factorization, a joint 
probability distribution can be expressed as follows [61]: 
( ) ( )( )∏=
≤≤ ni
iin XPaXPXXXP
1
21 ,, L                                        (69) 
where  
X i   = random variable represented by node i, ni ≤≤1  
n  =  number of nodes 
( )XPa i  = parents of node i  
For the root node which has no parents, its conditional probability is just the marginal 
probability. 
5.3.2 Modeling Bayesian networks 
For the simple example, its structure and parameters are assumed to be known in 
advance. For practical applications, the structure and parameters of a Bayesian network 
need to be determined, and this is called the modeling of Bayesian networks. Generally, 
there are two kinds of approaches to model a Bayesian network: artificial method (expert 
opinion) and data-driven method [59]-[61], [64]. Usually, a hybrid method which 
combines the merits of two approaches can be used. When the data-driven method is 
used to model a Bayesian network, it can be used to learn the structure and parameters.  
Learning parameters 
 Usually, a statistical approach can be used to learn the parameters of a Bayesian 
network, i.e. we assume that the data belongs to some distribution but the parameters are 
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unknown. Thus, we can use statistical methods to estimate the desired parameters. For 
instance, maximum likelihood estimation and Bayesian inference are two common 
methods. Due to the stochastic characteristics of learning the parameters of Bayesian 
networks, Monte Carlo simulation can be used to achieve the goal. Actually, the 
simulation result is the estimator that minimizes the likelihood function [65]. Statistical 
methods can be used to learn the parameters of a Bayesian network from complete and 
incomplete data, i.e. when some data is missing statistical methods can be applied as 
well.  
Learning structure 
 Similarly, statistical methods can be used to learn the structure of a Bayesian 
network. But, learning structure is more complex than learning parameters. Usually, 
some search techniques have to be used to learning the structure of a Bayesian network. 
In this chapter, the structure of the Bayesian network used is determined a priori, 
i.e. it is built by considering the causal relationships in composite power systems 
affected by hurricanes. The parameters are obtained by using random sampling. More 
details are given in the next section.  
5.3.3 Inference in Bayesian networks 
In Subsection 5.3.1, variable elimination method is used to compute the desired 
probabilities in a simple Bayesian network. This process is actually the inference in 
Bayesian networks. But for a practical Bayesian network, variable elimination method is 
inefficient, and more efficient algorithms have been developed. In this subsection, 
several common inference algorithms are introduced as follows: 
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Junction tree 
Actually, junction tree or join tree algorithm is an improvement of variable 
elimination method [65]. This method eliminates factors instead of variables and uses 
elimination tree instead of elimination order. Here, a factor is actually a conditional 
probability. The core of the algorithm is message passing formulation. Compared with 
variable elimination method, this method can eliminate a set of variables at a time. Thus, 
it is more efficient than variable elimination method.  
Conditioning method 
 Conditioning method uses conditional probability formula to decompose the 
original Bayesian network into some simpler ones, and suitable algorithms can be used 
for each small network.                                    
Local structure exploitation 
 Similar to conditioning method, local structure exploitation is actually a kind of 
methodology rather than an algorithm. It utilizes the local structure of a Bayesian 
network, i.e. the specific values of some parameters, to simplify the inference. Actually, 
the noisy OR-gate model used in this chapter is such a method which exploits the local 
characteristics of a Bayesian network. 
Approximate methods                                                                                                                                                                               
   The elimination method is an exact inference algorithm. For complex Bayesian 
networks, the computation can be expensive. Instead, some iterative methods can be 
used to get approximate results. The massage passing algorithm, originally designed for 
exact inference, can be extended to such a method. Another such method is Monte Carlo 
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simulation. It can be used not only for learning parameters but also for approximate 
inference.                                                          
5.3.4 Repetitive temporal model 
When the dynamics of some random variables are of interest, Bayesian networks 
can be applied to the time-specific case. The basic idea is to interconnect the Bayesian 
networks in different periods of time. When the structures of the Bayesian networks are 
the same and the interconnection is the same, the resultant Bayesian network is called 
repetitive temporal model [61]. Additionally, if the conditional probabilities in each 
period of time are the same, this model is called dynamic Bayesian networks. 
In this chapter, in order to investigate the impact of hurricanes on the short-term 
reliability of composite power systems, a pseudo repetitive temporal model is proposed 
to calculate time-specific system reliability indices. This model is a modification of 
repetitive temporal model and it is different from a dynamic Bayesian network. More 
details are given in Section 5.5.  
5.3.5 Types of random variables 
Basically, a Bayesian network can deal with discrete and continuous random 
variables. But, when the latter is modeled, the exact inference can be impossible for an 
arbitrary distribution. Usually, continuous random variables can be transformed by 
discretization, and then suitable methods can be used. In this chapter, all the random 
variables of the Bayesian network used are binary variables which represent the 
occurrences or not of some events.  
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5.4 Noisy OR-Gate Model 
In this section, the noisy OR-gate model used to investigate the impacts of 
hurricanes on composite power system reliability is described in detail. Firstly, the 
overall evaluation strategy is presented; secondly, the noisy OR-gate model used is 
described in detail; thirdly, the algorithm for simulating the required parameters is given; 
finally, the interpretation of the posterior probability of a common-cause failure is 
presented. 
5.4.1 Overall evaluation strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 25: Noisy OR-Gate Model 
 
 
The overall evaluation strategy for the impact of hurricane on the short-term 
reliability of composite power systems is shown in Fig. 25. This is the Bayesian network 
used in this chapter. Here, CCF i , mi ≤≤1 , is the ith common-cause failure; m is the 
Hurricane 
System Failure 
 
Independent 
Failure  CCF1… CCFm 
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number of common-cause failures. In Fig. 25, the impact of hurricanes on the failure rate 
increment of transmission lines is indicated by a dashed line, i.e. it is implicitly 
incorporated in the noisy OR-gate model used. More details are given in the next 
subpart. After the structure of the Bayesian network used is determined, the conditional 
probability distributions associated with the nodes needs to be determined. They are the 
marginal probabilities of the hurricane, the conditional probabilities of CCF i , mi ≤≤1 , 
and those of system failure. In the following discussion, P represents a probability, and 
1/0 represents the occurrence or not of an event.  
5.4.1.1 Probability of hurricane  
Since the dynamic impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite 
power systems is of interest in this chapter, i.e. the impact of hurricanes is investigated 
during their durations, the occurrence of a hurricane is assumed to be a sure event and 
the following equation is obtained: 
             ( ) ( ) 0011 ==⇔== HurricanePHurricaneP                          (70) 
5.4.1.2 Probability of common-cause failures 
The conditional probability distributions of a common-cause failure are the 
probability of its occurrence or not given the occurrence or not of the hurricane. First of 
all, the following assumption is used in this chapter: 
( ) ( ) 100001 ===⇔=== HurricaneCCFPHurricaneCCFP ii  mi ≤≤1   (71)  
The above equation refers to that only the hurricane can cause common-cause failures. 
In reality, other kinds of common-cause failures exist in power systems, e.g. station-
originated common-cause failures. For simplicity, in this chapter only the common-
 111
cause failures caused by a hurricane are considered. But, it is straightforward to model 
other types of common-cause failures by adding additional directed edges and nodes in 
Fig. 25.  
Following (71), only ( )11 == HurricaneCCFP i , mi ≤≤1 , needs to be 
determined. Then, ( )10 == HurricaneCCFP i  can be easily obtained as follows: 
( ) ( )11110 ==−=== HurricaneCCFPHurricaneCCFP ii       mi ≤≤1       (72)                               
In [66] reliability theory was applied to the risk analysis of transmission towers, and the 
effects of wind and ice on their failures were considered. However, the method in [66] is 
not suitable for the determination of ( )11 == HurricaneCCFP i , mi ≤≤1 . The reasons 
are as follows: 
1) The main effects of hurricanes are strong wind and heavy rainfall when they move 
over land.  
2) The reliability indices calculated in [66] are averages over long time spans.  
Thus, the time-specific failure model of transmission towers affected by 
hurricanes needs to be developed. This may be realized by using structural reliability 
analysis. For simplicity, ( )11 == HurricaneCCFP i , mi ≤≤1 , is assumed to be an a 
priori constant during the duration of hurricanes in this chapter. The relevant data is 
given in Section 5.7. 
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5.4.1.3 Probability of system failure 
The conditional probability distribution of system failure is the probability of its 
occurrence or not given the combined occurrences or not of common-cause failures, i.e. 
it is in the form ( )CCFfailureSystemP 1_ =  or ( )CCFfailureSystemP 0_ = .  
here,  
CCF = combination of the occurrences or not of all common-cause  
  failures  
For instance, it can be in the form as follows: 
{ }1,1,01 ==== CCFCCFCCFCCF mi LL   
or { }0,0,11 ==== CCFCCFCCFCCF mi LL      mi ≤≤1  
The number of all the combinations is 2m . If m is large, the determination of the 
conditional probability distribution of system failure is tedious. To solve this problem, 
some techniques such as parent divorcing and temporal transformation can be used [60]. 
But, they are not suitable for the Bayesian network used in this chapter. Here, noisy OR-
gate model is used and is described in detail in the next subsection.  
5.4.2 Noisy OR-gate model  
Like parent divorcing and temporal transformation, noisy OR-gate model 
modifies the structure of a Bayesian network by adding some auxiliary variables as well 
as corresponding directed edges to reduce its complexity logically when multi-causal 
relations are modeled. For example, a simple multi-causal Bayesian network is shown in 
Fig. 26. Here, Y i , 4,3,2,1=i , is the ith event. By using noisy OR-gate model, the 
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equivalent Bayesian network is shown in Fig. 27. Here, I i , 3,2,1=i , is the ith inhibitor 
(noisy); 1=Ai  if and only if { } { }10 == YI ii I , 3,2,1=i ; 04 =Y  if and only if 0=Ai , 
3,2,1=i . Clearly, Ai , 3,2,1=i , comprises the input of an OR gate and Y 4  is its output. 
Noisy OR-gate model makes a few assumptions: causal inhibition, exception 
independence, and accountability [59]. Basically, these assumptions refer to the fact that 
the inhibitors are independent with each other and one intermediate cause is enough to 
make the common result happen. Given the assumptions, equations (73)-(74) are 
obtained: 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 26: A Simple Multi-Causal Bayesian Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 27: Equivalent Noisy OR-Gate Model 
Y2 Y1 Y3 
Y4 
I2 Y3 I3 I1 Y3Y1
A1
Y4
A2 A3
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( ) ( )( )∏ ==−−==
i
iYYPYYYYP 1111,,1 43214        3,2,1=i                      (73) 
( ) ( )YYYYPYYYYP 32143214 ,,11,,0 =−==       (74) 
Equation (74) shows that noisy OR-gate model only determines ( )114 == YYP i , 
3,2,1=i , instead of determining ( )YYYYP 3214 ,,1=  directly. Thus, the determination of 
the conditional probability distribution of a multi-causal Bayesian network can be 
simplified. For example, 28 3=  conditional probabilities need to be determined if 
( )YYYYP 3214 ,,1=  is determined directly. By using noisy OR-gate model, only 3 
conditional probabilities need to be determined. In other words, the conditional 
probabilities to be determined can be reduced from an exponential number to a linear 
number. 
To determine the conditional probability distribution of system failure, the 
following equation is obtained by using noisy OR-gate model: 
( ) ( )( )∏ ==−−==
∈Ii
iCCFfailuresystemPCCFfailureSystemP 11_111_       (75) 
( ) ( )CCFfailureSystemPCCFfailureSystemP 1_10_ =−==                   (76) 
where, 
  I =  set of all the common-cause failures such that Ii ∈  if and only if  
   1=CCF i   
Equation (75) shows that noisy OR-gate model can be interpreted as a series connection 
of common-cause failures. Thus, the Bayesian network in Fig. 25 can be interpreted as 
follows: system failure is the failure of a series system consisting of common-cause 
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failures, i.e. only the occurrence of one common-cause failure is sufficient to cause the 
occurrence of system failure, and only when no common-cause failure occurs system 
failure does not occur. Presumably, equation (75) has the following implication: 
( ) 001_ === CCFfailureSystemP
                                           (77) 
Here, 0=CCF  represents that no common-cause failure occurs, i.e. 0=CCF i , 
mi ≤≤1 . In this chapter, both the independent and common-cause failures of system 
components are considered. Thus, equation (77) is modified as follows: 
( )01_ == CCFfailureSystemP
      
( )0,1_1_ ==== CCFfailuretindependenfailuresystemP     (78)           
Here, 1_ =failuretindependen  represents the occurrence of the independent failures of 
system components. Here, the failure rate increment of system components is 
considered. Equation (78) refers to that when no common-cause failure occurs, system 
failure is that caused by the independent failures of system components. The time-
specific value of the probability in (78) has been calculated in [13], and it can be directly 
used here as well as in the pseudo repetitive temporal model in the next section. 
Accordingly, equation (75) is modified as follows: 
( )CCFfailureSystemP 1_ =        
( )( )∏ ===−−=
∈Ii
iCCFfailuretindependenfailuresystemP 1,1_1_11   (79) 
Equations (76), (79) show that the conditional probability distribution of system failure 
is only determined by the following probabilities: 
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( )1,1_1_ === CCFfailuretindependenfailuresystemP i        mi ≤≤1  
These conditional probabilities can be obtained by using a simple simulation method. Its 
algorithm is described in detail in the next subsection.  
5.4.3 Simulation algorithm  
Simulating ( )1,1_1_ === CCFfailuretindependenfailuresystemP i , mi ≤≤1 , 
can be realized as follows: remove the transmission lines associated with the ith 
common-cause failure CCF i  simultaneously, then simulate the system failure only 
caused by the independent failures of other system components. Thus, a simple 
simulation method, named random sampling [24], can be used here. Basically, random 
sampling assumes that the states of system components are independent with each other. 
Thus, the simulation of system state can be realized by simulating the states of system 
components separately. Finally, the system state is usually checked by running an 
optimization routine in a composite power system. If there is any load shedding at any 
node, the system state is marked as failure; otherwise, it is marked as success.  
When the state of a single component is simulated, the following method is used. 
Firstly, a random number between 0 and 1 is generated, and then it is compared with the 
success or failure probability of the component to determine its state. Suppose the 
success probability of the component is aPS = , 10 ≤≤ a , and its failure probability is 
bPF = , 10 ≤≤ b , such that 1=+=+ baPP FS . If the random number generated is as 
follows: 
PRN S≤≤0         (80) 
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here, 
RN = random number, 10 ≤≤ RN  
Then, the state of the component is success. If the random number generated is as 
follows: 
1≤< RNPS         (81) 
Then, the state of the component is failure. Alternately, if the random number generated 
is as follows: 
PRN F≤≤0         (82) 
Then, the state of the component is failure. If the random number generated is as 
follows: 
1≤< RNPF         (83) 
Then, the state of the component is success. 
In Chapter IV, the time-specific failure probabilities of system components have 
been calculated. Thus, inequalities (82)-(83) can be used to determine the state of a 
component. Here, the simulation results are 
( )1,1_1_ === CCFfailuretindependenfailuresystemP i , mi ≤≤1 . The estimate of a 
probability is as follows: 
∑=
=
N
i
if FNP 1
1
        (84) 
where, 
P f  = ( )1,1_1_ === CCFfailuretindependenfailuresystemP i ,  
   mi ≤≤1  
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P f  = estimate of P f  
N = a sufficiently large number 
F i  = 


 =
otherwise
failuresystem
,0
1_,1
, Ni ≤≤1  
In this chapter, the coefficient of variation of the estimate is used to terminate the 
simulation, i.e. when it is less than a preset value. The coefficient of variation of p f  is 
as follows: 
( ) ( )
p
pVar
N
p
pVar
COV
f
f
f
f
p
1
==
                                    (85) 
where,  
COV p   = coefficient of variation of p f   
( )pVar f   = variance of p f    
( )pVar f   = variance of p f    
( )pVar f   = ( )∑ −
=
N
i
pF
N fi1
21
, estimate of ( )pVar f   
Here, an observation can simplify the simulation: if the transmission lines 
associated with a common-cause failure comprise a minimal cut-set, the following 
equation is obtained:  
11,1_1_ =








===
∈
CCFfailuretindependenfailuresystemP j
Jj
                  (86) 
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here, 
 J = index of a set such that Jj ∈ if and only if the transmission lines  
  associated with the jth common-cause failure comprise a minimal  
    cut-set 
The relevant data is given in Section 5.7. 
The algorithm of random sampling is as follows: 
1) For each common-cause failure, check if the associated transmission lines comprise 
a minimal cut-set: if true, the relevant probability is 1; otherwise, go to the next step. 
2) Set the states of the associated transmission line as failure. 
3) Simulate the states of other system components separately. Here, the failure rate 
increment of system components is considered, and the time-specific probabilities of 
components in [13] are directly used. 
4) The system state is obtained by combining all the states of components determined in 
Step (2) and (3). 
5) Run optimization routine which is model as the same as that in Chapter III.  
6) Check if there is any load shedding at any node: if yes, the system state is failure; if 
no, the system state is success. 
7) If the system state is failure, update the estimate; if not, go to the next step directly. 
8) Check if the convergence criterion is met: if yes, stop; if not, go back to step (3). 
5.4.4 Inference results 
Finally, the inference results of the Bayesian network in this chapter are marginal 
probability ( )1_ =failuresystemP  and posterior 
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probability ( )1_1 == failureSystemCCFP i , mi ≤≤1 . The former is the probability of 
system failure caused by both the independent and common-cause failures of system 
components; the latter is the occurrence probability of a common-cause failure when 
system failure has been observed. It can be interpreted as an importance index [67] and it 
indicates the weakness of a common-cause failure. Intuitively, greater is the posterior 
probability, more important (weaker) is the common-cause failure. Actually, 
( )( )1_1 == failureSystemCCFPMax i , mi ≤≤1 , is called maximum a posterior (MAP) 
hypothesis [65], and the corresponding common-cause failure is the weakest one. Here, 
Max is maximum operation. The posterior probability of common-cause failures can 
provide utilities another perspective on the decision-making process of hurricane 
prevention. The detailed analysis is given in Section 5.7. 
5.5 Pseudo Repetitive Temporal Model   
The pseudo-repetitive temporal model used to investigate the dynamic impact of 
hurricanes on composite power system reliability is shown in Fig. 28. Firstly, the 
duration of a hurricane is partitioned into n equal time intervals and each one is ∆t. Here, 
the value of ∆t can be determined by the tradeoff between evaluation accuracy and 
computational effort. Moreover, the speed of the development and dissipation of the 
hurricane should be taken into account. Then, during each ∆t the Bayesian network in 
Fig. 25 is used. For the whole duration of the hurricane, the Bayesian networks in 
different ∆t are only connected via system failure node.  
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Fig. 28: Pseudo Repetitive Temporal Model 
 
 
It is noted that the time-specific model used here is a modification of repetitive 
temporal model. Here, the Bayesian networks in different time slices are not connected 
by the directed edges as in repetitive temporal model. Instead, the connections between 
different Bayesian networks merely indicates temporal order, i.e. the Bayesian network 
in a time slice only affects that in the next time slice. This is similar to Markov property. 
This model is also different from a dynamic Bayesian network since the conditional 
probability distributions of system failure in different time slices can be different. The 
reason is that the failure rate increment of system components is considered here. 
Finally, the results obtained by using pseudo repetitive temporal model are the 
time-specific values of the inference results in the last section. In summary, the overall 
In the ith ∆t 
From the i-1th ∆t 
Hurricane 
System 
Failure 
 
Independent 
Failure  CCF 
To the i+1th ∆t 
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procedure for the evaluation of the impact of hurricanes on composite power system 
reliability is as follows:  
1) During each ∆t, use the method in the last section to determine the conditional 
probability distribution of system failure. 
2) Do inference in the Bayesian network to calculate the desired probabilities.  
3) At the end of the last ∆t, for each probability calculate its average during the duration 
of hurricanes. Actually, the average of the time-specific probability during a period 
of time is the fractional duration in the last chapter.  
5.6 A Simple Analytical Method 
In this section, a simple analytical method is proposed to investigate the impact 
of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite power systems. This method is 
an extension of the minimal cut-set method in Chapter III. Firstly, the identification of 
the extended minimal cut-sets is discussed; then, the computation of their probabilities is 
discussed. 
5.6.1 Identification of extended minimal cut-sets  
As mentioned before, the transmission lines associated with a common-cause 
failure may comprise a minimal cut-set or not. This is analyzed in detail as follows: 
1) If the associated transmission lines comprise a minimal cut-set, there is no need to 
identify further minimal cut-sets as far as these transmission lines are concerned. In 
other words, these transmission lines can be regarded as a first-order minimal cut-set.  
2) If the associated transmission lines do not comprise a minimal cut-set, these 
transmission lines can be regarded as one component, and further minimal cut-sets 
 123
can be identified up to the desired order by using the algorithm in Chapter III. 
5.6.2 Probabilities of extended minimal cut-sets 
After the additional minimal cut-sets are determined, their probabilities can be 
calculated as follows: 
1) If the associated transmission lines comprise a minimal cut-set, the probability of the 
minimal cut-set can be calculated as follows: 
i. If the number of the transmission lines is greater than the desired order of minimal 
cut-sets, the obtained minimal cut-set is a new one, and its probability is just the 
occurrence probability of the common-cause failure.  
ii. If the number of the transmission lines is less than or equal to the desired order of 
minimal cut-sets, the obtained minimal cut-set is an existed one, and its probability 
can be calculated as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0011 =⋅=+=⋅== CCFPCCFCPCCFPCCFCPCP CCCC kkkk kkk     (87) 
where, 
Ck   = existed minimal cut-set k 
Ck    = event that all members of Ck  fail  
CCFC k  = common-cause failure that Ck  associates  
1/0  =  occurrence or not of CCFC k  
From the above equation, the following equation is obtained. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )11011 =−⋅=+=⋅= CCFPCCFCPCCFPCP CCC kkk kk             (88) 
If ( )1=CCFP Ck  is small, then ( ) 111 ≈=− CCFP Ck , and the following equation is 
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obtained: 
( ) ( ) ( )01 =+=≈ CCFCPCCFPCP CC kk kk                   (89) 
The above equation shows that ( )CP k  can be approximated as two parts: the 
occurrence probability of CCFC k  and the probability of ( )CP k  when CCFC k  does 
not occur. Here, the second part can be calculated by using the multiplication rule of 
probabilities considering the fact that now the failures of the member of Ck  are 
independent with each other.   
2) If the associated transmission lines do not comprise a minimal cut-set, these 
transmission lines and other components may comprise a minimal cut-set, and its 
probability can be calculated as the product of the occurrence probability of the 
common-cause failure and the probabilities of other components. 
3) When the lower bounds of the reliability indices in Chapter III are computed, the 
above rules are also applicable to compute the probabilities of the joint events. 
5.7 Implementation 
In this section, the two methods proposed to evaluate the impact of hurricanes on 
composite power system reliability are applied to the modified IEEE reliability test 
system. Firstly, the relevant data is given; then, the evaluation results obtained by using 
different methods are presented and analyzed.  
5.7.1Test system 
In this chapter, the same modified IEEE reliability test system as those in the 
previous chapters is used as the test system. 
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5.7.2 Input data 
5.7.2.1 Hurricane data 
Here, the same time-specific regional hurricane data as that in the last chapter is 
used. 
5.7.2.2 Data of common-cause failure 
 
 
Table 20: Common-Cause Failure Data 
CCF Occurrence Probability 
Associated 
Lines 
Minimal 
Cut-Set? 
CCF1(B) 0.05 [32,33] No 
CCF2(C) 0.025 [25,26] No 
CCF3(E) 0.025 [18,20] Yes 
CCF4(F) 0.05 [12,13] Yes 
CCF5(G) 0.05 [34,35] No 
 
 
The data of common-cause failures is listed in Table 20. In Table 12 of [38] 
some transmission lines exposed to common-mode failures are described. They are on a 
common right of way or a common transmission tower for at least some length. In this 
chapter only the latter case is investigated, and the common-mode failures are indicated 
by using the same letters as those in [38]. As mentioned before, the transmission lines 
associated with a common-mode failure may comprise a minimal cut-set or not. The 
relevant data is also listed in Table 20. The determination of the minimal cut-sets is 
described in detail in Chapter II.  
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Table 21: Short-Term Joint System Failure Probability 
Time 
Interval 
( )1_ =failuresystemP  
Independent 
Failure 
Overall Effects 
(Bayesian 
Network) 
Overall Effects 
(Analytical 
Method) 
1 0.0036 0.1555 0.0787 
2 0.0076 0.1581 0.0833 
3 0.0133 0.1611 0.0901 
4 0.0197 0.1651 0.0984 
5 0.0262 0.1681 0.1074 
6 0.0327 0.172 0.1172 
7 0.0411 0.1761 0.1297 
8 0.0476 0.1803 0.1407 
9 0.0538 0.1841 0.1521 
10 0.06 0.1867 0.164 
11 0.0654 0.1922 0.1752 
12 0.0692 0.1925 0.1851 
Interval 
Frequency 
(Maximum)  
0.0692 0.1925 0.1851 
Fractional 
Duration 
(Average) 
0.0367 0.1743 0.1268 
 
 
5.7.3 Evaluation results  
The time-specific marginal probabilities of system failure obtained by using the 
two proposed methods are listed in Table 21 and are shown in Fig. 29. For comparison, 
the result in the last chapter where only the independent failures of components are 
considered, is also presented here. The obtained posterior probabilities of common-cause 
failures are listed in Table 22 and are shown in Fig. 30. The legends used in Figs. 29 and 
30 are as follows:  
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SP-IN: system failure probability only when independent failures considered 
SP-JOINT (BN): overall system failure probability by using Bayesian networks  
SP-JOINT (A): overall system failure probability by using analytical method  
FD-IN: fractional duration only when independent failures considered 
FD-JOINT (BN): overall fractional duration by using Bayesian networks 
FD-JOINT (A): overall fractional duration by using analytical method 
CCF1: Circle            CCF2: “× ”              CCF3: “+”               CCF4: “*”                     
CCF5: Square  
 
 
Table 22: Posterior Probabilities of Common-Cause Failures 
Time Interval 
( ) 5,,1,1_1 L=== ifailureSystemCCFP i
 
CCF1 CCF2 CCF3 CCF4 CCF5 
1 0.0245 0.0177 0.1474 0.2948 0.0256 
2 0.0266 0.0232 0.1454 0.2909 0.0316 
3 0.0295 0.0311 0.1433 0.2866 0.0354 
4 0.0364 0.0351 0.1405 0.281 0.0436 
5 0.0386 0.0431 0.1387 0.2774 0.0455 
6 0.0439 0.0467 0.1362 0.2725 0.0533 
7 0.0481 0.0544 0.1339 0.2678 0.0571 
8 0.0544 0.0588 0.1314 0.2628 0.0634 
9 0.0563 0.061 0.1294 0.2588 0.073 
10 0.0595 0.0685 0.1282 0.2564 0.0704 
11 0.0699 0.0687 0.125 0.2501 0.081 
12 0.072 0.0681 0.1252 0.2503 0.0785 
Interval 
Frequency 
(Maximum) 
0.072 0.0681 0.1252 0.2503 0.0785 
Fractional 
Duration 
(Average) 
0.0466 0.048 0.1354 0.2708 0.0549 
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Fig. 29: Overall Short-Term System Failure Probability 
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Fig. 30: Posterior Probabilities of Common-Cause Failures 
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5.7.4 Analysis of evaluation results 
     According to the above results, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Table 21 and Fig. 29 show that common-cause failures have a significant impact on 
composite power system reliability. When their effect is considered, as would be 
expected, the reliability of composite power systems becomes worse than that when 
only the independent failures of system components are considered. 
2. Table 21 and Fig. 29 also show that different overall reliability indices are obtained 
by using different methods. The reasons are as follows:    
1) The system failure probability obtained by using the Bayesian network is greater 
than that obtained by using the analytical method. The reason is that the former 
method considers all the combinations of common-cause failures whereas only 
partial combinations are considered in the latter method.  
2) The discrepancy of the results of two methods decreases with time. The reasons are 
as follows:    
i. Initially, the probabilities of the independent failures of system components are 
relatively small. Thus, the contribution of common-cause failures is big. Since 
two methods model common-cause failures differently as mentioned, the 
discrepancy of their results is big.   
ii. With system reliability deteriorating, the probabilities of the independent failures 
of system components are increasing. Then, the contribution of common-cause 
failures is decreasing. Although the models of two methods are different, the 
discrepancy of their results is also decreasing. 
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3. From Table 22 and Fig. 30, the following observations can be made:    
1) The posterior probabilities of CCF3 and CCF4 are greater than those of CC1, CC2, 
and CCF3. The reason is that the transmission lines associated with CCF3 and 
CCF4 comprise minimal cut-sets respectively. 
2) The posterior probability of CCF3 is less than that of CCF4 as its prior probability is. 
Actually, the posterior probabilities of CCF3 and CCF4 will be the same if their 
prior probabilities are the same, i.e. CCF3 and CCF4 cannot be distinguished. 
Similarly, the reason is that the transmission lines associated with them comprise 
minimal cut-sets respectively. To differentiate CCF3 and CCF4, the load-shedding 
values associated with their minimal cut-sets can be used. 
3) The posterior probability of CCF1 is less than that of CCF5 whereas their prior 
probabilities are the same.  
4) The posterior probability of CCF1 is less than that of CCF2 whereas its prior 
probability is greater than that of CCF1. 
5) Generally, the posterior probabilities of CCF3 and CCF4 decrease whereas the 
posterior probabilities of CCF1, CCF2, and CCF4 increase with time. The reason is 
as follows:  initially the probability of system failure is relatively small, the impact 
of important (weak) common-cause failures (CCF3 and CCF4) on it is big; with 
system reliability deteriorating, the impact of important (weak) common-cause 
failures decreases whereas the impact of unimportant (strong) common-cause 
failures (CCF1, CCF2, and CCF4) increases, i.e. important common-cause failures 
and unimportant ones are becoming indistinguishable with system reliability 
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deteriorating. 
4. For time-specific case, interval index fractional duration can more clearly indicate 
the characteristics of different evaluation results than time-specific failure 
probability. 
5. For the method of using Bayesian networks, most CPU time is spent on determining 
the parameters. This problem has been alleviated by using linear optimization, and it 
can be further alleviated by using the sensitivity analysis in Bayesian networks, i.e. 
analyzing the sensitivity of the evaluation results to the parameters of system failure 
node [59]-[61], [65]. The iteration number of simulating the parameters to which the 
results are insensitive can be reduced. 
6. For the analytical method, most computational time is spent on determining the 
minimal cut-sets. However, this needs to be done only once in current case where 
system load is constant. This is in contrast to the case when simulation method is 
used where it has to be implemented in each time interval.  
7. In this chapter, the proposed methods evaluate the impact of hurricanes on the short-
term reliability of composite power systems. They also can evaluate other types of 
common-cause failures, e.g. that caused by a bus failure. They also can be applied to 
other systems. For example, they can be applied to a substation to investigate some 
station-originated failures. 
5.8 Summary 
Common-cause failures have a significant impact on the reliability of composite 
power systems. In this chapter, two methods are proposed to investigate the impact of 
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hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite power systems. Here, both the 
independent and common-cause failures of system components are taken into account. 
One method uses Bayesian networks to alleviate the dimensionality problem of 
conditional probability method. The other method is a simple analytical method which 
extends the minimal cut-set method in previous chapters. These two methods are applied 
to the modified IEEE reliability test system. From the implementation, the following 
conclusions are summarized:  
1) The proposed methods are effective. They can evaluate the impact of hurricanes on 
composite power system reliability. When common-cause failures are not 
considered, the reliability of composite power systems is overestimated. 
2) The evaluation results obtained by using different methods are different. Choosing 
suitable method should depend on practical requirements. 
3) Posterior probability has different characteristics from prior probability. In some 
cases, its results are counter-intuitive. It can provide a new perspective on the 
reliability evaluation of composite power systems, and can be a helpful vehicle for 
the decision-making process of utilities.  
4) For time-specific case, interval index fractional duration can more clearly indicate 
the characteristics of different evaluation results than time-specific index. 
5) The proposed methods are applicable to other types of common-cause failures in 
other systems. 
6) The implementation of the proposed methods is mainly to demonstrate the feasibility 
of the ideas. Possible improvements can be investigated for practical applications, 
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e.g. developing the time-specific failure model of transmission towers damaged by 
hurricanes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 134
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
In this chapter, the evaluation methods proposed in previous chapters are 
summarized. Additionally, possible extensions of them are discussed. 
6.1 Summary 
Adverse weather such as hurricanes has a significant impact on the reliability of 
composite power systems. Predicting the impact of hurricanes can help utilities for better 
preparedness and make appropriate restoration arrangements. In this dissertation, long-
term and short-term impacts of adverse weather on the reliability of composite power 
systems are investigated.  
In summary, the proposed methods to investigate the impact of adverse weather 
on composite power system reliability are as follows: 
In Chapter III, the impact of adverse weather on the long-term reliability of 
composite power systems is investigated by using Markov cut-set method and sequential 
simulation. For the analytical method, an algorithm based on linear optimization is 
developed to identify system and nodal minimal cut-sets, and another algorithm is 
developed to compute the probabilities of minimal cut-sets and their unions. These 
algorithms are important not only for the inclusion of the impact of adverse weather but 
also for reliability evaluation of composite power systems. These algorithms differ from 
the previous cut-set methods that it can compute nodal indices and use linear 
optimization.  Both the analytical and simulation methods are applied to the modified 
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IEEE reliability test system. The evaluation results obtained by using different methods 
are compared and analyzed. The implementation demonstrates that comparable results 
can be obtained by using the analytical method, and meantime it can be faster than the 
simulation method. 
In Chapter IV, the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite 
power systems is investigated where the states of components are assumed to be 
independent. Firstly, a fuzzy inference system is combined with regional weather model 
to assess the failure rate increment of components affected by hurricanes. Here, different 
methods are used to build two types of fuzzy inference systems: Then, short-term 
minimal cut-set method is proposed to compute time-specific system and nodal 
reliability indices. This is the first time the cut-set method is used to compute short term 
reliability indices for composite power systems. The proposed methodology is also 
applied to the modified IEEE reliability test system. The implementation demonstrates 
that the proposed methodology is effective and efficient and is flexible in its 
applications.  
In Chapter V, the impact of hurricanes on the short-term reliability of composite 
power systems including the common-cause failures of components is investigated. 
Here, two methods are proposed to achieve this goal. One of them uses Bayesian 
networks to alleviate the dimensionality problem of conditional probability method. The 
other methodology is the extension of minimal cut-set method. As in Chapter IV, the 
time-specific reliability indices of composite power systems are calculated by using 
these two methods. The methods proposed also can compute nodal reliability indices. 
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They are also applied to the modified IEEE reliability test system. In the 
implementation, the results obtained by using different methods are compared and their 
discrepancy is analyzed. 
6.2 Possible Extensions 
In this section, two possible extensions of the proposed methods in this 
dissertation are discussed.  
6.2.1 Extension to distribution systems 
The proposed methods for investigating the impact of hurricanes on composite 
power system reliability can be extended to distribution systems in two ways as follows: 
6.2.1.1 Extension of methods 
When the proposed methods are applied to distribution systems, the only 
modification is the analysis of failure effects, i.e. determining a system state is success or 
failure as defined. The reason is that the configuration of a distribution system can be 
different from that of a transmission system. In a meshed distribution system, the 
identification of system states is the same as that in a transmission system, i.e. usually 
linear optimization is used to identify whether load shedding is needed. In a radial 
distribution system the analysis of failure effects becomes simpler, and network 
reduction method can be used. It is noted that the modification of the analysis of failure 
effects is applicable to both analytical and simulation methods. 
6.2.1.2 Nodal reliability indices 
The nodal reliability indices of transmission systems can be used in distribution 
systems, and more accurate evaluation results in distribution systems can be obtained. 
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The basic idea is to regard each node of the transmission system as a power source in the 
distribution system. Thus, the nodal reliability indices in the transmission system can be 
regarded as the reliability indices of the power sources in the distribution system. Since 
the reliability evaluation of power systems at hierarchical level III is too complex to be 
implemented directly, usually the reliability evaluation of distribution systems is 
implemented separately, and their power sources are assumed to be perfectly reliable. 
Considering the actual reliability performance of the power sources in distribution 
systems, more accurate evaluation results for power systems can be obtained at 
hierarchical level III.  
6.2.2 Extension to other applications 
The proposed methods in this dissertation are also applicable to other 
applications in power systems, e.g. operational reliability, and intermittent renewable 
energy.  
Usually, reliability evaluation in power systems is implemented for long-term 
applications, e.g. planning issues [37], [68]-[69]. Additionally, the reliability parameters 
of system components, i.e. failure and repair rates, are assumed to be constant, and the 
probabilities of components are calculated by using renewal process [68].  
However, the above approach is facing challenges in present power systems with 
some emerging applications, e.g. unit commitment considering probabilistic constraints 
[70], assessment of the impact of extreme weather [13], [15], and intermittent renewable 
energy [71]-[72]. The common characteristic of these applications is that the observation 
horizon is much shorter compared to that of planning. For example, electricity market is 
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cleared say every half an hour or an hour, some extreme weather say hurricanes last only 
a few days, and the output of some intermittent energy sources say wind energy can 
fluctuate hourly. In general, there is likely to be more emphasis on reliability evaluation 
over short term where the proposed methods can be used. 
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APPENDIX 
DADA OF IEEE RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM 
 
Table 23: Generating Unit Reliability Data 
Unit Size 
(MW) 
Number of 
Units 
Forced 
Outage Rate 
Mean Time 
To Failure 
(hr) 
Mean Time 
To repair 
(hr) 
Scheduled 
Maintenance 
(week/yr) 
12 5 0.02 2940 60 2 
20 4 0.1 450 50 2 
50 6 0.01 1980 20 2 
76 4 0.02 1960 40 3 
100 3 0.04 1200 50 3 
155 4 0.04 960 40 4 
197 3 0.05 950 50 4 
350 1 0.08 1150 100 5 
400 2 0.12 1100 150 6 
 
Note: 
FailureToTimeMeanapirToTimeMean
apirToTimeMeanRateOutageForced
___Re___
Re___
__
+
=
 
 
Table 24: Generation Mix Data 
Type Installed Capacity (MW) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Fossil Oil 951 28 
Fossil Coal 1274 37 
Nuclear 800 24 
Combustion 
Turbine 80 2 
Hydro 300 9 
Total 3405 100 
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Table 25: Generating Unit Locations 
Bus Unit 1 (MW) 
Unit 2 
(MW) 
Unit 3 
(MW) 
Unit 4 
(MW) 
Unit 5 
(MW) 
Unit 6 
(MW) 
1 20 20 76 76   
2 20 20 76 76   
7 100 100 100    
13 197 197 197    
15 12 12 12 12 12 155 
16 155      
18 400      
21 400      
22 50 50 50 50 50 50 
23 155 155 350    
 
 
Table 26: Bus Load Data 
Bus Load (MW) 
Percentage 
(%) 
1 108 3.8 
2 97 3.4 
3 180 6.3 
4 74 2.6 
5 71 2.5 
6 136 4.8 
7 125 4.4 
8 171 6 
9 175 6.6 
10 195 6.8 
13 265 9.3 
14 194 6.8 
15 317 11.1 
16 100 3.5 
18 333 11.7 
19 181 6.4 
20 128 4.5 
Total 2805 100 
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Table 27: Transmission Line Length and Forced Outage Data 
Bus 
(From) 
Bus 
(To) 
Length 
(ml) 
Outage Rate 
(/yr) 
Outage 
Duration 
(hr) 
1 2 3 0.24 16 
1 3 55 0.51 10 
1 5 22 0.33 10 
2 4 33 0.39 10 
2 6 50 0.48 10 
3 9 31 0.38 10 
3 24 0 0.02 768 
4 9 27 0.36 10 
5 10 23 0.34 10 
6 10 16 0.33 35 
7 8 16 0.3 10 
8 9 43 0.44 10 
8 10 43 0.44 10 
9 11 0 0.2 768 
9 12 0 0.2 768 
10 11 0 0.2 768 
10 12 0 0.2 768 
11 13 33 0.4 11 
11 14 29 0.39 11 
12 13 33 0.4 11 
12 23 67 0.52 11 
13 23 60 0.49 11 
14 16 27 0.38 11 
15 16 12 0.33 11 
15 21 34 0.41 11 
15 21 34 0.41 11 
15 24 38 0.41 11 
16 17 18 0.35 11 
16 19 16 0.34 11 
17 18 10 0.32 11 
17 22 73 0.54 11 
18 21 18 0.35 11 
18 21 18 0.35 11 
19 20 27.5 0.38 11 
19 20 27.5 0.38 11 
20 23 15 0.34 11 
20 23 15 0.34 11 
21 22 47 0.45 11 
 
 
 152
Table 28: Circuits on Common Right Way or Common Structure 
Right of Way 
Identification 
Bus 
(From) 
Bus 
(to) 
Common Row 
(ml) 
Common Row 
(ml) 
A 22 21 45  22 17 45  
B 23 20  15 23 20  15 
C 21 18  18 21 18  18 
D 15 21 34  15 21 34  
E 13 11  33 13 12  33 
F 8 10  43 8 9  43 
G 20 19  27.5 20 19  27.5 
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